

Marine Corps Gazette

FEBRUARY 1954 NUMBER 2 VOLUME 20

PROFESSIONAL MAGAZINE FOR UNITED STATES MARINES

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Marine Corps Gazette

COVER

As things stand on our cover, both the infantryman in the bunker and the tanker in the M-47 are well-protected. Once the order is given to move out, however, the situation changes. The infantryman has only his utility clothing between himself and enemy fire, while the tanker sits behind a 3-inch steel bulkhead. But that's only half the story, and because we don't want to steal the thunder from Captain P. E. Sanders' fine article on tanks in this issue we suggest you turn to it for the tanker's view. The cover shot was taken by TSgt Robert Mosier while he was a combat cameraman in Korea.

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Opinions expressed in the Gazette do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Navy Department nor of Headquarters, United States Marine Corps New lightweight material, easy to de-ice,

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protects radar instruments

without distorting the radar signal

Douglas "RADOME"

Problem, in airborne radar, to house instruments in a material which is easy to de-ice. Electro-thermal methods won't do. They affect the radar signal.

Douglas solves the problem with a new material, easy to de-ice. Rods of extruded wax are wrapped in fibre glass tape, impregnated with polyester resin. With multiple layers, Douglas builds the correct aerodynamic shape, then cures the resin at low temperature, and "sets" it under pressure. Next the temperature is raised and the wax melts away, leaving hollow passages through which hot air

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Enlist to fly in the U.S. Air Force

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Cake Knife M-1

DEAR SIR:

A large number of officers are now required to own a Mameluke sword. Now what? There is no other requirement. Marines who can execute the manual for the sword without the LPM are rare birds. But why bother to learn it? A rare tour aboard ship, or similar duty, is about the only place the sword is used.

Let's re-institute use of the sword at formations of company and above where greens, khaki or blues are worn. This move would be an extension of the swagger stick idea—more snap in our officers plus added color and ceremony.... It would be simple to have a sword slit put in our blouses, There has been a considerable cash outlay for the sword, so let's use it.

If something is not done soon, I predict a redesignation of "Cake knife MI," and said knife becoming a supply item for issue only at Marine Corps cake-cutting ceremonies.

K. R. STEELE Captain, USMC

Quantico, Va.

Army Comment

DEAR SIR:

Enclosed is a check for a one-year subscription and Association membership. Needless to say, I find your magazine one of the finest of all the military trade journals, and the most satisfying from the viewpoint of the rifle company NCO. Keep up the excellent work in the tactical and historical fields, and you'll always find my check in the mail.

HENRY P. GEDWED SFC, U. S. Army

Fort Lewis, Wash.

Press Relations

DEAR SIR:

The article You and the Press appearing in the December issue should be required reading for every Marine and the basis for at least one hour's instruction in the Marine

Corps Schools. Captain William Smolkin ably pointed out the more common pitfalls in dealings with the Press. Unfortunately, the only instruction in this field available to the average Marine is the often-cruel school of experience.

Long-needed guidance in meeting the Press and related subjects will soon be furnished by a Navy Public Information Manual now in the process of distribution, and a Marine Corps Informational Services Manual now being prepared.

L. E. HUDGINS, JR. LtCol, USMC

Washington, D. C.



On Stampings

DEAR SIR:

I think the answer to Lieutenant Loughlin's question, Why Not Use Stampings is, "We are, wherever possible." I think the lieutenant helped dispel the . . . connotation that stamped parts are inferior. There are two points in his article, however, that I must disagree with. First, the cold extrusion process is not "new." It has been reported that by the early forties, the Germans had already produced several million 37mm cases alone by this process. . . . The cold extrusion of steel shells is at present "SOP." It is true that we have been slower in picking up this technique but we are rapidly gaining, and in some cases have perfected better techniques than the Germans who originated the idea... JAMES W. ERWIN

Detroit, Michigan

DEAR SIR:

First, my congratulations to your editors on putting together a consistently-excellent magazine. . . .

Specifically, the article Why Not Use Stampings took me back to a June night in 1944 when I leaped out of a C47 over France and landed near a town called St. Mere Eglise. From then on I was to learn about the MG 42 and MP 43 automatic weapons of the German Army—weapons that were not machined, but were stamped out of metal. . . .

But it is the maschinen pistole that convinced me the German had a slight edge on us in weapons design.... We did not have a satisfactory weapon of that particular type. When we got our M3 "grease guns," we received an inexpensive gun but the bullet was poorly adapted for our needs....

I thought then — and if I were doing it over I would think now—that I want a fully automatic weapon that isn't too heavy, that will knock over any enemy soldier at about 50 yards when I'm aiming at him — and also can be used in conjunction with other weapons for harassing fire. . . .

MIKE RANNEY
Makeup Editor

The Minneapolis Tribune

What Source?

DEAR SIR:

I am writing in regard to the article *The Man With the Rifle*, by Lynn Montross. The article was very interesting but I do not agree with certain of his data. Being a student (in a small way) of ancient and modern warfare myself, I would appreciate knowing the source of his information . . . one of us is wrong.

Below are the items that do not agree. Mr. Montross' information is shown in italics, my source material is in regular type:

Fall of the Halls of Montezuma-

Morning of 14 September, 1847 First ancient battle in which tactics comparable to those used today were used—Arbela, 331 BC

Kadesh, soon after 1500 BC Strength of Richard's forces (bal-

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AIRCHILD

Aircraft Division

built to avoid these "extras." Designed specifically as a bulk cargo carrier, the "Flying Boxcar" hauls every conceivable kind of military cargo without dismantling and without special loading equipment - resulting in it being the best general cargo carrier in military use today.

Guided Missiles Division, Wyandanch, L. I., N. Y. . Engine Division, Farmingdale, L. I., N. Y.

tle with Saladin) in the year 1191—30,000

Close to 100,000

My information is based on source material obtained from Warfare, by Spaulding, Rickerson and Wright, and Memoirs of Grant, by Long.

GEORGE A. TKACH TSgt, USMC

DEAR SIR:

Technical Sergeant Tkach is of course right about the Halls of Montezuma falling in 1847. If I said 1848 I can't even claim a typo. . . .

As for the battle offering comparison with modern tactics, the sergeant's choice of Kadesh is doubtless as good as my selection of Arbela. It's mostly a matter of opinion.

But I question whether Richard had 100,000 men in 1191. Numbers in military chronicles aren't very trustworthy until modern times. Even when figures don't lie, liars do figure for propaganda purposes.

My information has come chiefly from Oman's Art of War in the Middle Ages and Hallam's History of Europe During the Middle Ages.

LYNN MONTROSS

Washington, D. C.

PAY

Long-handled Holdup

DEAR SIR:

I was just reminded of the troubles which several of us experienced with the two-piece winter underwear—long-handled drawers—which we wore in Korea in the winter of 1950-51.

Briefly, our trouble boiled down to this: When one is wearing a good



deal of winter clothing over the twopiece underwear, and carrying a pack, weapon, ammunition and miscellaneous gear, the combined weight of all this gear bears down so heavily

Available ONLY to officers and 1st 3-graders, who are married and at least 25-active, reserve, or retired. We have no agents and deal direct. Savings up to 30% from prevailing board rates in your territory, is passed on to you if you

can qualify. Protection against loss from bodily injury and

on the belt-line of the drawers that the skin wears off the hipbones.

On one occasion near Koto-ri, despite the extreme cold, I found my self forced to undress almost entirely so that I could relieve the situation by attaching home-made suspenders to the drawers and thus stop the constant abrasion of my—by then-raw pelvic extremities (east and west points thereof, when facing south).

This may seem like a tardy, trivial footnote on a situation which prevailed at that time and place, but certainly unnecessary discomfort should be avoided in whatever future cold-weather operations the Corps may engage in. Equipment Board please copy! Let's have: (1) one-piece "longies" or (2) suspenders.

GEORGE S. CHAPPARS MSgt, USMC

Pittsburgh, Pa.

Recruiting — 1953 Style



Dear Sir:

Why is it that Marine Corps recruiters continuously harp on personal security as an inducement for enlistment or re-enlistment?

During the days of the depression in the thirties, this may very well have been a sufficient and compelling motivation. But this is 1954! . . . First of all, why not ask the question: Why do men join the Marine Corps in the first place?

And in answering it, there is no need for rationalization because in practically every case the answer is that the new boot believed the Marine Corps to be the best! Security? Nonsense! His one motivation was the desire to belong to the best military service in the United States. In other words, the loadstone that brings the 18, 19 and 20-year-olds (the heroic ages) into the Marine

property damage liability; medical payments; accidental death; comprehensive personal liability and fire & theft coverage. Covers collision & towing. World-wide claim service. Former Marines who know your problems handle LESS your policies. Greatest savings possible to preferred risks. HOUSEHOLD & PERSONAL PROPERTY NOW This floater policy covers everything personal anywhere in U.S. or abroad. It protects your household goods, clothing, uniforms, furniture, jewelry and valuable personal effects. Insures you against 14 named perils. Best type of coverage at lowest cost. GOVERNMENT SERVICES INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS (NOT AFFILIATED WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT) Government Services Insurance Underwriters Crockett and Presa Streets, San Antonio, Texas NAME ADDRESS AGE .. RANK MARRIED .. SINGLE CAR DESCRIPTION ANNUAL MILEAGE BUSINESS USEAGES OF DRIVERS ☐ AUTO IN U.S. ☐ AUTO OVERSEAS ☐ PERSONAL PPTY. MAIL COUPON TODAY

AUTO

Artist's conception of a "Flying Radar Station" - new hush-hush project of our coastal defenses.

ON THE JOB ... not "on the way"

It takes 30 sharply trained specialists to keep this Flying Radar Station aloft and operating — ready to alert our shores instantly at the first "blip" of enemy aircraft.

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SOUTHWEST AIRWAYS
TRANS-TEXAS AIRWAYS
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES
UNITED AIR LINES
WEST COAST AIRLINES
WESTERN AIR LINES

Corps is the promise of travel and adventure. The normal American youth is not looking for security; he does not need to be bribed into serving with the best. . . .

SAMUEL L. GRIER Captain, USMC

Japan

Why "Staff" Sergeant?

DEAR SIR:

Efforts are being made in the Corps today to re-emphasize the position of the non-commissioned officer-many believe that a return to the ranks and insignia existing prior to 1948 would help.

It would restore the straight stripe in the insignia of Staff NCOs performing non-line duties. I believe the pride of both line and non-line NCOs would be raised by such a distinguishing device. . . .

With the change in chevrons, a return to the titles of "platoon," "gunnery," "master gunnery," "first sergeant" and "sergeant major" should be made. The senior NCO of a platoon holds the position of

platoon sergeant. Why call him "staff

Your uniform will be individually

tailored to your exact measurements

Jos. A.

sergeant?" The words "staff" and "technical" sound rather inappropriate applied to the positions such grades hold in artillery batteries and infantry companies. . . .

MARTIN B. REILLY Captain, USMC

San Diego, Calif.

Canine Scouts

Dear Sir:

... I have raised dogs the past five years and have a limited experience in obedience training. Through this training, I have picked up a knowledge of the numerous capabilities of dogs.

Dogs are incomparable as scouts and mine detectors. As scouts, because of their acute sense of smell and sound, they are able to more quickly alert a patrol than any other means presently employed. They can indicate the direction and, with a good handler, the distance. . . . The British trained dogs so thoroughly they were capable of detecting mines which were buried in the beach and being washed over by salt water.

The Army has had an ever in-

creasing number of stories about their dogs in Korea. The success of many patrols can be attributed to the use of scout dogs. It is my opinion that the Marine Corps could employ dogs on patrols . . . as scouts and mine detectors. . . .

> FLOYD M. BURGESS MSgt, USMC

Korea



Not Who's Who-What's Who

Dear Sir:

The Armed Forces Identification Card (DD Form 2, MC 1Jan50) now in use has a space provided for "Grade." At the present time the grade is not changed along with an individual's change in grade in the enlisted ranks. This results in his having an I. D. card with one grade and a liberty card with another grade. This discrepancy can cause inconvenience in establishing identification with civilians as they cannot, in many instances, understand why an item of such . . . importance is not kept currently correct.

WILLIE L. LOWE, JR. TSgt, USMC

Jacksonville, Fla.

Sam Browne Again

Dear Sir:

... It has always been my opinion, possibly erroneous, that the Sam Browne belt was dropped because of the scarcity of good leather. Now that we have enough leather to wrap around a 24-inch length of dowel (an innovation of which I approve), maybe we can revive the Sam Browne belt. . . . It certainly fits in with the same traditions . . . that brought back the swagger stick.

J. C. HARRINGTON Major, USMC

Hialeah, Florida

with all basted fittings so you're sure of a perfect fit that compliments you - constructed from iron-tough, USMC approved fabrics so you're sure of lasting quality. Wilner's skill gives you the best uniform at reasonable prices. Terms gladly extended. Mail orders promptly filled. See or write Jos. A. Wilner & Co. today! CORNER 14TH & H STS. N.W., WASHINGTON. D.C.

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our authors

→ Colonel Keith B. McCutcheon's article Equitatus Caeli (page 24) traces the history of a Marine helicopter transport squadron from its experimental stages through combat operations in Korea. Colonel McCutcheon, who holds a B.S. degree in management engineering and an M.S. degree in aeronautical engineer-



COL MCCUTCHEON

ing, entered the Marine Corps in 1937, and after graduation from Basic School in 1938 joined the USS Yorktown. He served at Pensacola, Quantico and Guantanamo Bay prior to World War II.

Colonel McCutcheon commanded HMX-1 at Quantico in 1950, and took over as CO of HMR-161 in Korea in 1951. Among the colonel's decorations are the Silver Star, Legion of Merit, DFC and the Air Medal with five stars. He currently is serving with the United States European Command.

MSgt Edward J. Evans has contributed Time on Target—177 Years (page 36), a history of Marine artillery. Sergeant Evans began his military career with a cruise in the Army in 1937, but changed to Marine greens in December 1941. During World War II he served with the 12th Defense Bn in Hawaii and



MIGT EVANS

later with the 6th Defense Bn on Midway. A graduate of the sixmonth course at the Motion Picture School, Fort Monmouth, N. J., Sergeant Evans entered motion picture production in 1949 as a

script-writer at MCRD, San Diego. He is now acting in that capacity with the Motion Picture Production Unit at Camp Pendleton. In this month's lead article, Up with the Tanks (page 10), Captain Paul E. Sanders sheds some light on just what our tanks and tankers can—and can't—do. Captain Sanders attended Ball State Teachers College and the Indianapolis College of Pharmacy in Indiana before en-

listing in the Marine Corps in 1941. He is a veteran of the Guadalcanal campaign and, more recently, Korea where he was a warded the Bronze Star. Between wars he was a member of the



CAPT SANDERS

Marine Garrison Forces in the Pacific and later served with the 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune. Following his return from Korea, Captain Sanders attended the Armored School at Fort Knox and then came to Quantico. At present he is recruiting officer for Hq Bn of Marine Corps Schools.

Just as we were putting this issue to bed, Major Ralph M. Head was pinning on the gold oak leaves of his new rank. Major Head (Do Not Confirm or Deny, page 48) left his hometown of Detroit in 1942 for a career in the Marine Corps, and in 1943 he was commissioned. For two

years he was in the Pacific area as provost marshall with MAG-24. Returning to the states in 1946, he remained with the air branch this time at Cherry Point as criminal investigating officer. In 1947



MAJ HEAD

the major served as CO of the MP Company, 2d Mar Div, and two years later went to the Atlantic Fleet as a combat cargo officer. He attended Junior School prior to his present assignment with the Marine Corps Development Center, Quantico.

These days there are three things every Marine must memorize: his serial number, his weapon number and his MOS. In To Classify or Not to Classify, MSgt Cornelius J. Evers gives us the background on our

MOS and personnel system. Sergeaut Evers shines in articles of this type, His background of 12 years in the Marine Corps includes several billets as first sergeant and a three-year tour as an instructor in the Personnel Administration School at Parris Island. He recently has returned from a tour with the 1st Engineer Bn in Korea and is now stationed at MCAS, El Torro, California.

* Captain Nicholas A. Canzona's Shape-up for "A" War (page 16) is the winning entry for Group II (Company Grade Officers) of the Marine Corps Association's 1953 Prize Essay Contest. The article, written while he was I&I in Baltimore last year, received the \$500 award for its class. Captain Canzona

entered the Marine Corps in 1943 through the V-12 program at the University of Notre Dame. His billets have included Midway, Pearl Harbor, Camp Lejeune and a Mediterranean cruise. Prior to being as-



CAPT CANZONA

signed to the 1st Mar Div in Korea in 1950-51, he attended the Army's Engineer School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. When Captain Canzona left Baltimore, he traveled only 36 miles to the office of the Historical Branch, G-3, HQMC, where he is collaborating on a four-volume history of the Korean conflict.

Major Reginald Hargreaves, M.C. (British Service), returns to our

pages with a eulogy of the military staff — The Olympians (page 40). A frequent GAZETTE contributor, Major Hargreaves is a veteran of line and general staff service in France and Gallipoli during



MAJ HARGREAVES

World War I. He was retired on medical grounds after being severely wounded in 1917, but returned to uniform during World War II. In addition to his articles on military history, Major Hargreaves is the author of several books.



THAT'S A TRANSISTOR, invented at Bell Telephone Laboratories. This tiny electronic device can do many things that vacuum tubes can do and more besides. Though little larger than a coffee bean, it can amplify electric signals 100,000 times.

She's Holding a Five-year-old Granddaddy

The *Transistor* was announced only five years ago but it is already the daddy and granddaddy of many promising offspring. All of the growing uses of this tiny electronic device stem from its invention at Bell Telephone Laboratories.

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Seldom has there been an invention with such exciting possibilities in telephony and in other fields. A recent issue of The Reader's Digest calls it "The Fabulous Midget" and reprints these

words from an article in the Science News Letter: "In less than half a century, the electronic tube has changed the world. The effect of the transistor on our lives may be equally potent."

The Bell System, in accordance with its established policy of making all of its inventions available to others on reasonable terms, has licensed forty companies to make and sell transistors. These include makers of advanced equipment for defense, as well as radios, television sets, computing machines, hearing aids and electronic apparatus.

One of the first uses of the *Transistor* in telephony was in the new electronic equipment which enables telephone customers to dial Long Distance calls from coast to coast.


We can already see the time when it will bring many other improvements in both Local and Long Distance service.

BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM



LOCAL... TO SERVE THE COMMUNITY.

NATIONWIDE... TO SERVE THE NATION.



anks

The infantryman thinks the tanker has an easy time of it, but it's different when you're on the inside looking out



them hard and they knew their jobs. His tank commanders were wise beyond their years and his gunners had proven that they knew how to use the tank guns effectively. Two months of combat had welded the platoon into a close-knit unit which operated smoothly and efficiently. The officer had been an infantry sergeant at one time and was first to praise the foot soldier. He had to admit secretly, however, that he had never fully realized the poten-

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tial of a tank antil he was transferred to the tank battalion and given a platoon of "Iron Monsters."

The turret of the tank came to a sudden stop and the voice of his gunner came over the inter-com telling him that a squad of enemy was moving into firing position on the crest of the hill. Steadying his field glasses in the direction indicated, the tank platoon leader was able to pick up movement in the area, although he could not make

out the figures as clearly as his gunner who was looking through a telescope attached firmly to tons of steel.

The platoon commander flipped a switch and spoke into a hand mike. Four hundred yards away the infantry platoon commander listened on his radio and acknowledged the transmission. He talked rapidly to the tank commander and checked off the air. His runner listened to a series of rapid orders and ran forward to contact the squad leaders.



Back at the tanks the platoon leader breathed a curse. Was the infantry officer crazy? "Don't shoot over our heads. I'm afraid you might hit my men. We'll take care of the enemy, you protect our flanks."-that was the word sent back. The tanker dropped down into the turret and took a look through the gunner's scope. Yep! There were the enemy troops all right, about 300 yards above the Marines who seemed to be finding it tough going up the hill. The lieutenant groaned aloud. With five rounds he could neutralize the target which was practically point blank at 700 yards. He flipped the switch and spoke into the mike again. Some 400 yards away the same answer was sent back, "I don't want you shooting over the heads of my troops. We'll take the crest; you watch the flanks."

Through his field glasses the tank leader saw some puffs of smoke appear on top of the hill. He snatched his earphones away in time to hear the sound of burp guns. As he watched, the infantry scrambled for cover, two of the men dragging themselves slowly. A corpsman darted forward. Suddenly a few explosions scattered smoke and dust over a portion of the attacking line of Marines. "Mortars," thought the tank officer as several more rounds exploded. The fire from the crest seemed to increase. "Lordy, if I could only open up," muttered the tanker. He flipped the switch and spoke into the mike again. No response. Another try. No response. Through his glasses the tank officer spotted a group of enemy going into position on a slightly higher hill to the right flank. He passed fire orders to his tanks and took the hill under fire. A figure detached from the infantry and raced toward the tanks. The runner arrived breathless and "Stop firing! Stop white-faced. firing! You are hitting our men."

THE TANK LEADER jumped out of his tank and onto the ground. "Settle down, Mac, and give us a repeat."

"Stop shooting, the lieutenant says you are hitting our men!"

The tank officer's jaw dropped slightly. "We haven't fired a round in your direction. That's enemy stuff."

"Well, sir, the lieutenant sent me



Korean roads—built for oxcarts, not 46-ton tanks

back to tell you to quit shooting," and the runner raced off.

"Hey, what's the matter with your radio?"

"A piece of shell went through it. The operator got it, too." The runner was gone.

"My aching back," thought the tanker. "I obey orders and stay here to cover the infantry by fire, only I get further orders not to fire over their heads, and now I'm accused of shooting the daylights out of them. A fat lot of good I have accomplished today." He crawled dejectedly up on his tank and waited for the infantry to return.

The foregoing is a hypothetical situation—an example of the kind of thing which we must prevent through training!

It is my unswerving opinion that the most dangerous soldier in the world today is the Marine infantryman armed with his T/O weapon and unlimited faith in his comrades. However, it must not be lost to sight that his effectiveness is increased in direct proportion to his proper use of the supporting arms available to him, the most versatile of these being the tank.

It has been my experience that there exists a lively spirit of competition between the different arms of the Corps. This is ideal only as long

as this spirit does not deteriorate into actual animosity and refusal to co-operate with, see the value of, or understand the correct use of one branch of the Corps by another, This situation, naturally, would result in a weakening of co-ordination and co-operation dangerous to the common cause. Co-operation be tween tanks and infantry especially must be of a high degree, and failure to arrive at a common understand ing is dangerous. For instance, friction can arise if the infantry commander utilizing tanks does not heed the tankman's advice on the tactical use of tanks in a given situation. And as infantry commanders are generally senior in rank, the outcome is evident. It is a situation that tends to make the tanker feel like an inefficient nincompoop in the eyes of the infantry, a nincompoop more interested in saving his own hide than helping the fire fight.

I am of the opinion that there are more ex-infantry officers in tanks than there are ex-tankers in the in-



Tank-infantry ...

fantry. Thus the tank officers are well aware of the hardships and difficulties encountered by the footslogger. I believe that tankers, to a man, put aid to the infantry above all else. However, there are times when protection of the tank is also of vital importance, especially when replacements are limited.

Our tank leaders are instructed in

the principles of tank warfare according to the present Marine Corps doctrine. The tactics of the tank are very similar to infantry tactics. Fire and movement, cover and concealment, formations, mutual support and protection from direct fire the principles are the same whether you are in a tank or on the ground. Yet the duties of the four or five men in the tank are much different from the duties of five infantrymen. The latter are obliged to take care of their rifles, and perhaps a machine gun or a mortar in addition. The men in the tank are responsible for three or more machine guns, a 90mm cannon, a submachine gun and their pistols. After a day of heavy fighting they must reload the tank with approximately 60 rounds of 90mm ammo (each shell weighing about 42 pounds), several thousand rounds of caliber .30 and a few hundred rounds of .50 caliber. They must also refuel the tank, lubricate it, add oil and water and clean the inside.

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All this must be done before the

down and discuss the situation? 'Fraid of the dark?" . . . "What are you wasting ammo on? I don't see anything to shoot at?" . . . "You knocked my whole squad flat with that big gun. Why don't you watch where you're shooting?" . . . "Why don't you keep those pig-iron monsters off my wire? Think all I have to do is repair wire you guys tear up?" . . . "I want your tanks to move out in five minutes. Crank them up and get going." . . . "I don't want you tankers around me. All

fantry. Possibly, slight revisions or our training objectives might allow us to get better acquainted with the tank.

It is my earnest wish to present the tank from a tanker's point of view, hoping that it will in some way bring about better understanding between tanks and infantry the end result being better tank-infantry co-ordination. If the Marine Corps is to maintain top fighting efficiency, it must put more emphasis on close co-ordination and co-opera-



M4A3 - gallons of napalm ready for action

you do is shoot up my men."..."My platoon led the attack all the way from Wonsan to Yudam-ni. What I want to know is: Where were your wonderful tanks then?"... "That terrain looks okay to me. Let's move out."

Now, here are some comments that will make stankers feel the whole job is worthwhile. "Thanks a lot for the lift. Our packs and equipment were getting mighty heavy." . . . "Thanks for hauling out our dead and wounded." . . . Thanks for bringing us food and ammo, it saved us a lot of time and work." . . . "Glad you got here in time to knock out those bunkers. They were giving us a fit." . . . "Thanks for staying up on the line with us last night. Gave my men a big boost in morale." . . . "You tankers sure got your nerve riding through that mine field. I wouldn't ride a tank through there for love nor money."

I am sure that all officers in the Marine Corps have a basic knowledge of tanks, but sometimes this knowledge is too limited to allow some of them to appreciate fully the value of the tank in support of intion between these two arms.

First of all, let us consider the tanks used in the Marine Corps today. We have the M4A3 (a flamethrower tank which is becoming obsolete), the M47 tank and the M48 tank.

We could relate the book characteristics of these tanks but I don't think they are important to this article. Book characteristics are cold, technical facts concerning armament, speed, weight, etc.—facts anyone can dig up through reading, even if he's never seen a tank.

I would like to direct your attention toward the "field" characteristics of these tanks. By this, I mean the things you learn about tanks by training and working with them. Actually, a tank commander has a lot to think about besides supporting the infantry. His ear must be sensitive as an airplane pilot's as he listens to the roar of the engine. He must know the sound of a smoothly running engine so well that the least change is noted. He must listen for strange squeaks or noises in the suspension system, the turret controls, the gun carriage and the radio. He is assisted by the mem-



mutual protection

tank is ready to move out the next day. A tanker has his problems, and it is understandable that he might froth at the mouth when the infantrymen say, "What have you got to worry about? You have three inches of steel around you and all I have is my dungarees."

Or, "Why don't you guys ever crawl out of your tanks and come

bers of his crew who instantly report any trouble they see or hear. It is highly important to catch these mechanical failures immediately so that instant maintenance will reduce stoppages before they become sufficiently critical to require extensive repair in a rear area. The more efficient the crew, the better and longer the tank will operate - it takes a long time to train replacements. That's one of the reasons why the company commander orders the men to stay inside the tank unless a critical situation warrants exposing their relatively valuable hides.

Tanks can really be temperamental at times. They require constant care and attention. The older they get the more cantankerous they become. Moreover, a tank responds more readily to the man who has been driving it a long time, as if it recognizes its master's touch. The driver also seems to learn the idiosyncrasies of the tank he drives and can get much more out of the tank than a new driver, although both might have the same amount of driving experience.

Also, tanks must be oiled, greased, tuned, cleaned, washed and overhauled at regular intervals if their efficiency is to be maintained. Dirt and twigs must be cleaned out of the interior, otherwise they might gather around a vital moving part and jam it. A tank out of action for mechanical reasons is just as surely out of the fight as if it had been hit by an enemy shell.

Why do tankers object to staying on the front line at night? Not because they are afraid of the dark, but because proper maintenance cannot be given a tank to prepare it for action the next day. However, if a particular tank unit is going to be relieved the next morning, then it is feasible for it to stay on the lines if there is sufficient ammunition to make it worthwhile. After all, no commanding officer is going to risk sending gasoline and ammo trucks up on the front lines to resupply tanks if enemy observation and artillery can blow them sky-high.


A tank consumes an enormous amount of gasoline during a day's operation. It must be replaced, sometimes from gas trucks, sometimes from cans. If the going is difficult, consumption is increased. A tank holds over 200 gallons of gas,

and even when idling it will burn about 20 gallons an hour.

In supporting the infantry, a tank is either moving, or the engine is idling while the tank engages a target. It is not smart practice to shut off the engine each time the tank stops, unless the tank commander is certain that he is going to stay in one area long enough to make it worthwhile. Cranking up the engine repeatedly is a waste of gas and a strain on the electrical system.

the tank becomes "bellied up," which means that the weight of the tank is resting on the belly of the tank and not the tracks—thus the tank is stopped effectively and must be towed onto firmer ground. Frozen ground denies the cleats a chance to dig in and grip, and the tank is then as helpless as a pig on ice. Sitting in tons of uncontrollable metal sliding down a hill is quite a sensation, believe me, especially when a deep gorge is yawning at

th



Tons of steel held together with sluggardly nuts and bolt

As is generally known, tanks are very sensitive to terrain and weather. The tank commander can only learn by experience just what areas his tank can negotiate. Thrown tracks are the price paid for misjudging terrain, and a thrown track effectively stops a tank and requires hours of labor to repair. Only a man who has broken the track apart and replaced it in its proper position on a cold, wet day or night can fully appreciate the amount of frustrating labor required to struggle with the hundreds of pounds of steel held together with bolts and stubborn nuts and clamps.

Rain and cold cut down the mobility of tanks. They can move only when the cleats on the tracks clutch earth that doesn't give way. As the earth slides out from the tracks, you from one side. Tanks have rolled down a hill without suffering irreparable damage, but the poor lads inside could never be repaired.

The weight of the tank is a big factor in considering where the tank can or cannot go. Many of the roads in Korea are so narrow that the treads of the tank hung over the sides of the road, breaking down the shoulders when a tank was forced to use them, and making it difficult for trucks in the rear to pass through This was one of the reasons why the troops at Hungnam moved all the way to the Chosin Reservoir without tank support. The tanks were all at Wonsan and the only way to get them to Hungnam was by road -1 distance of some 80 miles over narrow, steep and tortuous roads.

If the tanks had been allowed to

proceed overland they might have conceivably torn up the MSR so badly that trucks would not have been able to get through until major repairs had been made. Also, the steep winding road would have thrown a terrific strain on the tank engine, and the engine might have given up the ghost on some narrow portion of the MSR overlooking a steep drop. This would have necessitated a long repair job, or pushing the tank over the side.

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IN ADDITION, poor bridges and inadequate bypasses made considerable reconnaissance necessary to determine the need for engineer work. Therefore, until the MSR was deemed passable, the high command figured it was impractical to take the risk and the tankers assumed the role of infantrymen and spent several days in extensive patrolling of the area north of Wonsan while their tanks sat idle. Finally, fortune smiled. Perfect weather, a passable road and skillful driving resulted in one company of tanks negotiating the distance. It is a credit to the effort of the tank maintenance men that the trip was made in about 40 hours without fatal mishap, although four tanks threw tracks at one very difficult bypass and it took the tankers several hours, wrestling in the mud and water, to replace the tracks. As I say, until you have wrestled with a ton of steel track on a cold wet night, you haven't lived.


Also, with only a flashlight for illumination, you need a lot of faith

in the guy who is swinging a sledge at the end of the crowbar you are holding.

After the troops had reached Koto-ri, tank support was again denied for the same reasons that kept the tanks at Wonsan. The MSR up the mountain was too narrow in spots to allow the tanks to pass without great danger of their going over the side. Actual measurements taken in some of these places showed that the edge of the tank track would have been right on the edge of the road, and the possibility of the side of the road giving away was too great. Had a tank broken through, the men at the top would have been cut off from their normal flow of supplies. Therefore, until the engineers could make the road passable, tankers were again delegated to foot patrol action along the MSR, and used to help protect vital bridges.

After the road had been widened, a special platoon of the bulldozer tanks dropped their blades and proceeded to Hagaru, followed by a platoon of M-26s. Then on the 27th of November two companies of M-26s negotiated the road and arrived at Koto-ri just in time to join a task force headed for Hagaru. One company of tanks managed to get through with the loss of one tank. Another tank was hit by bazooka fire but made the perimeter. Another tank ran out of gas just inside the roadblock established by the Marines.

After getting up the mountain, the tankers were faced with another



Stateside training schedules hadn't included icy roads

problem. Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton are the areas in the states where most Marines learn to drive tanks. There were, at that time, no provisions for instruction on driving over icy roads in zero weather. I can say that we had a pretty slippery time of it until the drivers became accustomed to the terrain. The M-26 did much better than the M4A3 because, having a sort of hydromatic drive, it got a more even flow of power than the clutch-type M4, and did not spin its tracks as much.

One tank with a special crew managed to negotiate the difficult passage to Yudam-ni. It was touchand-go over the icy road. The crew then returned to Hagaru to lead the rest of the platoon through. However, the enemy struck that day and the route was blocked. Helicopters flew a tank crew to Yudam-ni and the tank was used very successfully by the infantry in making the fighting march back to Hagaru-ri. The rest of the tanks remained at Hagaru and were used on the perimeter, where they contributed much to the defense of that area.

The above resumé is necessary, I believe, because I would like the infantry to understand that at times it takes high-level decisions to get the tank support they want and need.

(To be concluded next month)





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SHAPE-UP FOR 'A' WAR

Can our Marine division move out fast enough to develop an atomic beachhead?

tudied the effects of atomic weapons doubt that they have revolutionized what is commonly called "conventional warfare?" To put it more strongly, a realist might warn that to deny the decisive influence of atomic weapons in future wars is suicidal folly. And surely this is true of large-scale amphibious operations which, by their very nature, are highly susceptible to atomic defensive measures, and at the same time greatly dependent upon supporting atomic weapons for success.

In the assault phase of the shipto-shore movement, we consider the progress of troops from their transport carriers to the firm establishment of a target beachhead. This consideration alone is awesome in planning atomic war; for past experiences, however successful, are unsound criteria in an age of truly mass destruction.

I leave the problem of transport security to the future fleet commander, who probably will look back on the days of enemy shore batteries and hostile air strikes with wistful longing. Certainly he will realize that the bumper-to-bumper traffic of an Inchon harbor is now in the category with the musket and powderhorn. In fact, he should note that even at Inchon we were stretching our luck in a most speculative manner, because a few, well-placed nuclear explosions would have destroyed the only mobile striking force in the Pacific.

But studying the problems of the Marine landing force is a far more fearsome and exhaustive task. Here, the principles of control and maneuver, dispersion and concentration and consolidation and exploitation are now at odds with each other. Certain problems such as getting ashore are actually simplified, for

there can never be another Betio under the explosion of an atomic bomb. At the same time, other con-

In judging Shape-up for "A" War as the best essay submitted in Class II of our Prize Essay Contest, the Editorial Board was aware that the article does not, and undoubtedly could not, cover the many ramifications of amphibious operations in an atomic war and still keep within the 5,000-word limit imposed by the contest rules. Furthermore, the Board wishes to stress the fact that selection of this article does not necessarily constitute agreement with the operational concepts and opinions it advances. At the same time, the Board believes the article will accomplish a great deal towards stimulating thought and inducing further articles on this subject, perhaps in the nature of a "rebuttal."


THE EDITORS.

siderations are magnified a hundredfold, since there must be dispersion yet control and effect, immediate decision yet caution, speedy exploitation by widely dispersed units yet co-ordination and singular effort.

When troops first leave their transport carriers, whether these be troopships, submarines or aircraft carriers, they will experience a feeling of being very much alone, a feeling which is never appreciated in combat. This must be so because the ever-present enemy capability of atomic attack will make it foolhardy for our troop commanders to tempt an enemy with concentrated units. So, in all probability the movement from ship to shore will be characterized by this loneliness, although it will take place at considerable speed. Planning such a movement off a hostile shore will be a monumental task to say the least.

The required shock effect at the beachhead will have been accomplished beforehand, of course, by one or more nuclear explosions; and the landing force—if all goes according to plan—will step quietly

Iwo Jima-repetition would invite oblivion



from assault carriers into a sinister, eerie vacuum literally loaded with


countless surprises.

After landing, troops will still feel that weird loneliness, because intelligent commanders will surely realize that a repetition of the Iwo Jima beach scene would invite oblivion for thousands of Marines. Then too, the nagging demand for speed will keep areas relatively clear, for no one must tarry in a freshly radioactive area.

At this stage, consolidation and exploitation will become meaningful terms. The former is particularly challenging in view of the fact that atomic beachheads must be huge in comparison with those established in conventional operations of the past. To ensure our remaining on an enemy shore, great numbers of troops must land; yet wide dispersion will be fundamental to minimize the crippling effects of atomic counter-measures. So the space factor in consolidation will be extremely important as we make normal calculations in terms of miles rather than yards. Obviously then, consolidation of several square miles will constitute a complicated phase of the future amphibious assault, although it should not be too diffi-

Exploitation, however, will be another matter, since it will be difficult and vexing to exploit the weakness of an enemy who is not present in terms of conventional beachhead probability. Surely no enemy will be foolish enough to try to stop an amphibious force at the shoreline, when that force is backed by atomic weapons. The enemy will attempt his death blow either at sea or just inshore, before the huge atomic beachhead can be consolidated. Thus, the successful amphibious assault will require deep penetration by fast, widely dispersed units. But it is well to remember that too much speed and dispersion deep in enemy territory can be dangerous. A powerful enemy force could parachute from a fleet of jet transports in a matter of minutes, or, knowing our potential enemies as we do, it should not appear unusual if a huge army suddenly were to emerge from the very bowels of the earth. Such possibilities would materialize a few

If overwhelming enemy forces did



Sufficient strength to win

thus appear and quickly engage the dispersed landing force elements, the issue would become critical, to put it mildly. Our best counterstroke against such a surprise would be the employment of atomic weapons, but it would be difficult to use these against a horde of enemy intermingled with our own forces.

Looking back, we have considered a few of the broad problems of an amphibious assault in atomic war, beginning offshore and ending on a deep-beachhead line. Summarizing, one concludes that there must be sufficient strength to win, but that concentration of this strength at any given time or place must be kept to an absolute minimum. It follows that to accomplish combat missions, the landing force must be designed to concentrate with great rapidity, do the assigned job and disperse again just as rapidly. Communications must be direct and streamlined. Intelligent and forceful decision, without hesitation, by commanders will be a minimum requirement of atomic leadership.

Now where can these brief considerations lead a realistic thinker today? To a powerful question: Is the present Marine division designed to carry out a decisive amphibious assault in an atomic war?

The answer is an emphatic, No!

Our present-day divisions would face a Herculean task in carrying out a landing on a potential enemy's shore. A successful operation could only be insured by first pounding



... but no concentration

the enemy into almost complete helplessness.

In the light of atomic development both in the United States and abroad, one look at the massive machinery of our division should convince us that it is going to need some changes if it is to function effciently on an atomic beachhead. Used as a land-warfare force in the atomic era, it conceivably could function with its present organization, though it would still be cumbersome. But in an amphibious assault under the threat of nuclear reprisal by a capable enemy, today's Marine division would be like a bear in a pit.

Oh, we looked around us in Korea and speculated on the effects atomic weapons would have in such a tactical situation—the jammed roads, the massing of men and equipment made necessary by the kind of war we were fighting, the restricted beach areas . . . we looked at these and said, "Well, we must put up with these things in Korea; however, if the 'Big One' ever comes, then things will be different, of course."

When is the "Big One" coming? Tomorrow? Next month? Next year? Are we going to make the necessary adjustments overnight for the incalculable fury of shattered atoms? From across the sea have we not already heard numerous, ominous

reports of underground airfields, subterranean industries and other huge facilities carved into the earth? Have we not already met on the field effective 10,000-man divisions which are almost invisible and yet maintain a formidable potential for modern war?

How much longer will we delude ourselves by saying that we are really ready today?

For a moment, let us digress to a strategic premise for planning a future war. For the sake of this premise, let us assume that World War III has been forced upon us and that the United States, after taking into consideration the strategic implications of the world map and a set of population statistics, has decided to use atomic weapons immediately. (The enemy's known capability of launching an atomic attack against our continent had, of course, greatly influenced our decision.)

Thus we can assume that the telltale mushroom cloud will pave the way for Marines as they begin their amphibious assault of the future. And we can also assume that the enemy will have a number of atomic explosives which he will definitely use against any attempted invasion of his homeland or satellite buffer. Going on this latter assumption. will it be feasible to employ today's gigantic landing machinery in an attack from the sea? Can we land regiments abreast on a beach to be followed by battalions of tanks, trucks and signal equipment? Can

we push in ponderous engineer forces and service groups to support the exploitation by the assault elements? Surely the answers are negative; and yet our present intradependent organization is designed for just such mammoth operations, with the resultant congestion and confusion.

We are being dangerously unrealistic to have so much mass packed into a single tactical unit. If the Marine division is designed and trained to operate one way, it will find itself in a precarious position as it tries to make on-the-spot adjustments to gear itself for real atomic war. Will we wait until an atomic bomb explodes in our faces before we finally realize the tremendous destructive power of this new weapon?

Thus, to prepare ourselves for atomic war it is necessary first to note on one hand the vicious effects of nuclear weapons and then, on the other, the vast picture of a Marine division either afloat or ashore. Conclusion should come quickly—Someone has to go!

Now it is not the purpose of this essay to drag the reader through a sea of military occupational specialties, tables of organization and command and staff structures. My intention is to draw a broad picture which, I hope, can be supported by the reasoning already presented.

Throughout the amphibious assault of the future, decision must come fast. It follows that a minimum of people should have a hand in affecting decision. This same principle can be considered in connection with the mechanics of maneuver. Obviously, a fire team can maneuver more quickly than a squad, a platoon more quickly than a company, a battalion more quickly than a regiment, and so on.

The degree of control and flexibility in the delicate situations of atomic warfare will be directly proportional to the size of a unit and its commander's ability to appraise and decide. If a chain of command is slogged with people, wires, frequencies, priorities, etc., then decision will come slowly. On the other hand, if communications and responsibility are direct, then accurate estimates and sound decisions can be made in a minimum of time.

So, in hunting for that "someone" to eliminate, one must look at nec-



. . or disaster will follow



essary extremes and then probe in the middle; for there must always be effective strength, yet this strength must not become unwieldy. In this regard, I offer brief appraisals of the Marine company, battalion, regiment and division, each of which is presently a vital cog in the machinery for the amphibious assault.

The company is certainly not unwieldy, and the deadly combat effectiveness of its present organization has been proved in countless cases. It is very maneuverable, and, with good teamwork within, it can be closely regulated and controlled. But the company is too small for relatively independent operation on a far-off piece of hostile real estate.

In the battalion we have a picture of more significant strength; yet, at the same time, not too much direct control and flexibility have been sacrificed. In many cases the battalion commander can personally control his companies. Frequently he can see all of them in action, and he is always so close to the actual combat situation that he can feel the pulse of battle. This organization is strong enough to accomplish sizeable missions and defend itself, but it can hardly be considered a lucrative target for one of the enemy's few, precious atomic bombs.

Not so with the massive Marine regiment! Here is a powerful striking force, to be sure. And here also is the perfect target for the tactical atomic weapon. The regiment is too large for direct control even in conventional warfare, let alone in an

atomic situation which requires wide dispersal. It is not easy to move a regiment, at least with the speed which will be required in the assault of the future. Also, the regimental commander must assemble reports and recommendations from three powerful subordinate units deployed either in depth or across a wide frontage. If any or all of these reports and recommendations indicate the feasibility of employing atomic weapons, the commander will be using up precious time as he sifts through his pattern of information preparatory to advising the division commander.

There are too many people in a regimental headquarters. These people require too much space, too much transportation, too much food and too much information. In the vital minutes needed for decision and maneuver in atomic war, they will waste too much time and add confusion and delay.

The vast communication network of a regiment is too delicate and complicated for the swift-moving atomic assault from the sea. It constitutes a needless bottleneck for information which must reach the higher commander in a minimum of time, so that battalions may seize opportunities or avert disasters.

Moving on to the division, we find the natural command structure for a self-containing assault unit capable of accomplishing big missions. To the rank and power of the division commander should be entrusted the authority for unleashing the power of tactical atomic weapons. A division of nine battalions is strong enough to seize and hold an atomic beachhead, but still small enough to be guided by a general with a modernized, capable staff. True, the commander cannot see all of his battalions in action, but he can control them if communications are direct, if he always knows just exactly what they are doing, where they are and what they need.

Here one might ask, "Well, isn't all this the very reason why we have regimental commanders?" Yes, in conventional warfare. But why have four such people in division in the lightening movement of atomic war? In the battle of minutes and seconds, why should an intermediate commander and his staff thrash out a situation and then pass it on to a higher echelon where it must be worked over again? By stretching our imaginations to visualize the true setting of the atomic battlefield, we should be led by common sense to recognize that the line of contact between assault elements and overall command decision must be direct.

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Thus the argument is out for a modern, atomic division realistically designed for the amphibious assault of the future. Such a shock unit should consist of nine assault battalions directly under the control of the division commander; and this organization should persist until the assault has developed into a successful, large-scale invasion. Then, after there is sufficient land, time and sta-

"An eerie vacuum loaded with surprises"







Atomic weapons - who's to choose the time and place?

bility, the intermediates, the staffs and assistants and the rest of the huge machinery for sustaining land warfare can take their rightful place in a more conventional situation.

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Ideally, the atomic division would consist of approximately 12,000 Marines. It certainly should not go above 15,000. Now these may sound like ridiculously arbitrary figures, but let me remind anyone with this opinion that one does not build a door to fit around a key. Scientists had to design an atomic bomb that could be carried by an airplane; they could not sit back complacently and expect aeronautical engineers to construct a flying colossus capable of transporting part of Oak Ridge to Japan. And then these same determined men went even further by designing an atomic shell for a cannon.

Faced with the dawning realization that atomic war will be different, Marines can be just as practical and successful in designing a realistic tactical organization.

In conclusion, let us apply the idea of a trim, light-weight, atomic division to our doctrinal considerations in the assault phase of the shipto-shore movement. I invite the closest scrutiny and comparison as these principal guides are spelled out, so that each reader can honestly appraise the true merits of the proosed organization as compared with the present Marine division.

a. Degrees of concentration or

dispersion and changes therein. Is rapid concentration or dispersion easier to accomplish with units of 1,000 men or units of 5,000? Also, think of the regiment as a highly desirable atomic target; then, if it is not feasible for a regiment to really operate as a regiment, there should be no need for this organization. Considering concentration required for a specific mission, one might argue mathematically that two regiments can be massed more easily than six battalions. The apparent logic here wears thin when one considers the excessive weight of the regiment, the additional staff work, the problem of transport and traffic, the numerous voices, etc.

b. Initial shock at the beach. If initial shock is necessary, it certainly should be accomplished by atomic weapons. Sustained shock within the huge beachhead will be the atomic commander's consideration, and he can best effect this with light-footed battalions knifing through secondary And any defense which defenses. can't be knifed through should be bludgeoned with nuclear explosions, not Marines.

c. Sustained and increased pressure upon the enemy. Cannot this be best acomplished by a division commander who has complete command of the situation and can maneuver nine, swift, hard-hitting battalions at will? Do not draw an incorrect picture by imagining a single commander trying to control

nine battalions on line. This will never be, for disposition in depth will always be fundamental. Think more of columns, and emphasize a strong, dispersed reserve.

d. Sufficient flexibility to exploit weaknesses found in the enemy defenses. Here again is that repetitious comparison: There must be sufficient strength yet minimum tar-

get. And there must be speed, speed, speed! Enemy "weaknesses" which require the heavyweight punches of regiments should be classed as targets for tactical atomic weapons.

e. Efficient utilization of supporting arms. Reinforced battalions are proportionately as strong as reinforced regiments—and considerably more so when backed by a division commander with authority to use atomic weapons. An artillery battery with each battalion should provide enough effective firepower against lesser objectives, particularly if a division fire-direction center can co-ordinate missions among the various batteries when necessary. Battalions are capable of calling and using air and naval gunfire; and a division headquarters certainly should be equally capable of controlling and co-ordinating this support. During the crucial period of the assault, why should intermediate commands be necessary?

f. Tactical integrity of troop organization commensurate with the foregoing principles? Again and again, as long as a regiment cannot normally operate as such without presenting a target for atomic counterblows, where then is its tactical integrity? If it maintains sufficient dispersion, it is nothing more, in effect, than three battalions.

Thus is completed a broad analysis which some may consider far too brief for such a weighty subject. But I feel that the basic proposal with its accompanying arguments, however brief, plunge through the veneer and into the very heart of an elementary design for survival and victory. To those who think largely in terms of antiquated tables and catalogues, I say that the ominous, terrible statistics now being assembled on atomic power must be recognized as the criteria for planning all largescale military operations of the future. And well does this include planning an amphibious assault in US & MC atomic warfare!

in brief

Navy Secretary Robert B. Anderson (right) had a few flattering words to express when he toured the 1st Mar Div sector of responsibility in Korea. "To me," he said, "the Marines are among the most elite fighting men in the world."

Beefed up by the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team and the 56th Tank and Amphibious Tractor Bn, the 3d Mar Div provides the nucleus for Provisional Corps, Japan. MajGen Robert H. Pepper, USMC, commands the newly formed corps. Staff officers of the 3d Mar Div have assumed dual functions in the corps.

Only unit of its type in the Marine Corps, the 1st Provisional Amphibious Reconnaissance Group is now in training at Kaneohe Bay, T. H. A small, fast-moving organization, the Recon group is working out with helicopters and rubber boats on the island of Oahu getting ready for full-scale maneuvers. Shown (right) is TSgt David L. Denison, who doesn't let two broken ankles slow him up in training his pack-howitzer outfit for the exercises coming up soon.







Now celebrating his silver anniversary in the Corps, MSgt Sidney L. Patterson (left) began his career riding a horse with the old Horse Marines back in 1917. Now with the 2d Mar Div at Camp Lejeune, Patterson finds it easier going than it was 25 years ago, as he sits behind the wheel of a 75-horsepower jeep.

The Draft will take 18,000 men during the month of February. All will go to the Army. The Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force do not intend to place calls with Selective Service for February.









The Nike, the Army's first supersonic, anti-aircraft guided missile is shown in action above. Left to right—on the launching platform: next, approaching the target plane: and far right, at the moment of impact—target destroyed!

The FN (right) is one of the new lightweight rifles being tested by the Army. It is capable of replacing the M-l, carbine, machine gun, submachine gun or BAR. It is shorter and lighter than the M-l and it has a 20-round capacity. The FN will be chambered for the new experimental .30 cal. shell. (See below.) The newly-developed arm is manufactured in Belgium.





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
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To avoid re-tooling problems, five of the 14 NATO nations have agreed to adopt the new, lightweight cartridge (shown at right compared with standard .30 caliber shell) developed by the U. S. The new 7.62-mm round is one-half inch shorter and 10 percent lighter than present standard rifle ammunition. There is no great difference in performance.

A Signal Corps mobile television cameraman (left) demonstrates a contemplated use of television in the future. A TV camera, located on the front lines, will survey an area and transmit the picture back to higher headquarters in a rear area.





Forrest summed up the tactics of his cavalry with "Git there fustest with the mostest." His counsel still holds good. Witness Cavalry of the Sky

Equitatus Caeli



THE FIRST OF 12 HELICOPTERS descended steeply to the sharp ridge near the top of the mountain, hovered momentarily and landed. Five fully equipped Marines jumped out. The time, September 20, 1951. The place, Korea. Thus began the first airborne assault by helicopter in the history of warfare. Operation Summit it was called by the men of the 1st Marine Division who planned and executed it.

Helicopters were not exactly new to Korea; they had been used from the beginning, but not in this way and definitely not on this scale. Craft of the required size hadn't been available in sufficient numbers. It had taken time to plan, prepare and get ready for this particular operation. In fact, it took over five years.

The first atomic bomb tests at Eniwetok had caused forward-looking Marine Corps planners to analyze critically the concept of amphibious operations. Not that the bomb made such operations obsolete. Not at all. In fact, the Corps and the Navy developed the doctrine for amphibious operations with the reverses at Gallipoli still fresh in their minds. Now it was time to study them again in the light of lessons learned at Bikini.

These planners reasoned that an

amphibious task force of World War II proportions would constitute a profitable target for an enemy with an atomic bomb capability. A method was needed to reduce that profit. Dispersion, mobility and speed needed to be injected into the task force and one solution seemed to lie in the use of helicopters.

With that in mind the Marine Corps commissioned Marine Helicopter Squadron One (HMX-1) at the Marine Corps Air Station, Quantico, Virginia, in December 1947. The primary mission of the squadron was to develop tactics and techniques for the use of helicopters in an amphibious operation—a responsibility assigned to the Corps by the National Defense Act of 1947.

For most of the next three years the squadron busied itself in experiments. Utilizing the HO3S Sikorsky helicopter and the HRP Piasecki, the unit experimented with wire laying, cargo hauling, troop lifts, carrier operations, communications, maintenance and all the other aspects of the over-all problem. It was not a large squadron - 'copters were not plentiful and there were a lot of bugs to be worked out. But the program did succeed in training a small group of pilots and maintenance personnel and it did pioneer the use of rotary-winged aircraft in largescale military operations.

Then came Korea. When the 1st Marine Brigade landed at Pusan on the 2d of August 1950, it had attached a small number of Sikorsky HO3S helicopters and a handful of pilots and mechanics from HMX-1. In the next few months that unit made a name for itself. So successful were they in their operations that they completely sold all military men on their usefulness and necessity. Demands for 'copters far exceeded the supply. Expansion of production facilities followed and so did the interest of all potential military and civilian users. The Marine Corps not only accelerated its existing plans, but it also succeeded in getting approval for an expanded program.

One of the types of squadrons to come out of the new funds was the Marine helicopter transport squadron; and the first such unit was HMR-161, commissioned at the Marine Corps Air Station at El Toro, California, in January 1951.

Under the leadership of LtCol George W. Herring the squadron began the time-consuming process of organizing. Personnel were joined, equipment procured, aircraft accepted, pilots trained and the whole unit was prepared for a prospective movement overseas.

On April 7th, the first helicopter arrived, a Sikorsky HRS-1. It was a three-bladed, single main-rotor configuration with a single tail-rotor to compensate for torque. Theoretically it could carry 10 passengers in addition to the two pilots, but only for short distances.

Except for four pilots who had experience at HMX, the remainder had just received transition flight training to helicopters within the past five months. Most of the mechanics were new at the game too. Due to foresight, however, quite a number had been given on-the-job training at HMX pending arrival of the squadron's own 'copters. Pilots likewise had been trained either at Quantico or at the Navy's school at Pensacola, Florida.

An intensive syllabus was conducted to introduce all the pilots to the types of operations that were expected to be conducted in Korea. Emphasis was placed on mountain flying up to 6,000 feet altitude. This in itself was a totally new experience for all pilots as practically all of their previous experience had been at sea level.

Finally, in August 1951, the squadron loaded aboard ship and departed for Korea.

Upon arrival, it was attached operationally to the 1st Marine Division commanded by MajGen Gerald C. Thomas. Camp was set up in a few days and the squadron was eager to go to work.

On 13 September, Colonel Herring attended a conference with the division chief of staff, Colonel Victor H. Krulak. At that morning conference were members of the division staff. The purpose of the meeting was to tee-up a helicopter mission for the supply of a front-line battalion that afternoon. Operation Windmill I was born.

It was a co-ordinated effort on the part of all arms—infantry, artillery and air. It went off smoothly from the initial reconnaissance flight to the last supply run. Landing spots had to be developed in the rough terrain so the 'copters could land, communications had to be maintained between the various units and surveillance had to be maintained over the area to see what, if any, reaction the enemy would have.

Six days later a similar mission was executed. The pilots gained in-



A technique worked out on the Potomac . . .

valuable experience in terrain appreciation, low-level navigation in unfamiliar terrain and flying with external loads.

The flying crane, external hoist technique was used in these operations. It was a technique developed back in the early days of HMX and was now paying dividends under combat conditions. Cargo nets were loaded with the badly needed supplies and slung by means of hooks beneath the helicopters. This method permitted the aircraft to deliver the loads rapidly to small areas and cut down the loading and unloading time. It also reduced the time the 'copters would be vulnerable to enemy fire in the forward areas, and provided a means for jettisoning the load quickly in the event of an emergency.

But it was Operation Summit that the squadron was looking forward to—the first trooplift. It was not long in coming. Only one week after Windmill.

A reinforced reconnaissance company was to be airlifted to the front to relieve a unit of the ROK. From the outset it was obvious that landing sites were nonexistent in that razorback-like terrain which rose up to 3,000 feet above sea level. There were places, however, below the crest of the highest hill which could be developed into suitable landing sites within a reasonable period of time.

It was accomplished by hovering the 'copters over the selected points and letting specially equipped Marines climb down from them hand over-hand by the use of knotted ropes, another technique dreamed up back on the banks of the Potomac. In about an hour the vegetation had been cut down and the razor-like ridge excavated, built-up and flattened into an area 50' by 50' so that one HRS could land comfortably and the troops could disembark. Then in a continuous column the reinforced company was shuttled from the rear to the front They were placed on high ground, fresh and ready to fight. A new technique in the book of warfare had been demonstrated and successfully executed. To provide comminications between the company and other units to the rear, two wire lines were laid by helicopter. In 1 matter of minutes the wire was laid over terrain that would have required a patrol on foot hours to accomplish.

IT WASN'T ALL easy pickings. On one occasion a pilot took off with a man still on the rope, and when the crew chief called up and said, "Sir, the man is still on the rope," the pilot recovered his momentary loss of balance, made another approach and let the man down. The squadron later preserved the incident for history in its squadron song:

"They were hovering on the slope While the man came down the rope. They still had lots of power to

So before he reached the ground They took off and flew around



. . . paid dividends on Korea's ridges

While the man was dangling freely in the air.

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"As he hung there in the breeze
From his thousand-foot trapeze,
He knew his chances must be pretty
slim;

But they made another pass And dropped him ______

THERE WERE still skeptics of these new twirly birds though. They said the 'copters were too vulnerable, they couldn't fly at night or under conditions of low visibility.

Sure helicopters are vulnerable. But so is a tank, a ship or an infantryman. All combat units expect to and do take losses. Techniques must be worked out to reduce the vulnerability. So far the rotary-wing aircraft have proved that they can operate in and forward of the front lines if they are employed intelligently.

And they can operate at night.

Operation Blackbird proved that.

The squadron was ordered to lift a reinforced company of the division reserve from its assembly area to a position near the division's left flank at night.

But there was a lot to do before the event came off. Liaison was established with the parent battalion; reconnaissance flights between the embarkation point and landing sites were made in an effort to determine compass headings, landmarks, time and distance checks and altitudes; the engineers had to clear the prospective landing zones of mines; and night indoctrination and familiarization flights were made to ensure that all the pilots who were to participate were thoroughly checked out and oriented with the terrain.

In order to fly the designated route the pilots took off initially from a dry stream bed, climbed and cruised through two mountain passes and let down into a valley to the landing spot. The return trip over a different route to ease the traffic problem required that three passes be negotiated with a final letdown of 1,000 feet to the stream bed loading site. Just to keep the pilots on their toes they were ordered to avoid several friendly artillery positions. To further complicate matters there was no moon, and the sky had a high, thin overcast which reduced visibility.

Blackbird proved that helicopters can operate at night even under adverse conditions, provided certain other conditions exist, such as daylight reconnaissance of the area, familiarity of the pilots with the locality and the existence of some prominent terrain landmarks to guide the pilots. There is a great deal of development to be done yet before operations such as this become routine.

Perhaps one of the most publicized helicopter missions in Korea has been the evacuation of wounded from the front lines to rear areas where prompt, adequate medical attention was assured, including lifesaving surgery if required. HMR-161 came in for its share of such flights also, although this was not

the primary mission of the squadron. There were other 'copters available from another unit for this purpose. Occasionally, however, the number of casualties required the use of a larger aircraft or the presence of a medical officer with the patient in the craft was deemed necessary, so HRSs were assigned to the mission.

In its first six months of operations overseas the squadron evacuated a couple of hundred casualties, many of them from front-line company positions. Quite a few of them were flown to the coast and landed aboard the Navy's hospital ship USS Consolation, the first hospital ship to have a helicopter landing platform installed. This ship provided a floating hospital.

During the period of her stay, the squadron made a number of landings aboard by day and night in weather which often prevented the operation of small boats between the ship and the beach. The ship believed that the HRS was very useful for this purpose because of the load it could carry and the fact that it could and did operate by day or night, seemingly without regard to weather.

All helicopter pilots received a great deal of satisfaction in transporting evacuees as they realized the importance of this most humane mission. Literally thousands of American boys owe their very lives to these "flying angels of mercy."

HMR-161 has continued on with the pioneering efforts in the field of rotary-wing aircraft. Perhaps as a symbol of the future they chose as their squadron slogan the Latin phrase Equitatus Caeli, Cavalry of the Sky. To date they have performed many of the missions of the old horse cavalry and then some for full measure. They can very well become the eyes of the ground commander and provide him with visual protection of his front, flanks and rear. In addition they can move his battle elements to positions where they can do the most good. They can give the force, the speed, mobility and dispersion which are essential in this modern age of warfare. The techniques may be new, but the tactics are still those of the Confederate cavalry leader Forrest who reputedly said, "Git there fustest with the mostest."

Equitatus Caeli!

US P MC



OR NOT TO CLASSIFY

A few round pegs are forced into square holes from time to time, but don't blame classification. A personnel system is only as good as the people who implement it

happened that fateful day. The yellow cards began appearing with the service records of the individuals who reported to the organization for duty, and directives were being issued by Headquarters Marine Corps regarding the assignment of individuals based on their "spec" numbers and the proper methods for assigning, changing and voiding these numbers.

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About this same time rebellious cries came forth from the offices of these first sergeants and sergeants major. "Down with classification!" "What's this Marine Corps coming to, anyway?" "Now, in the Old Corps . . . " The feeling was so strong and the cries were so loud that even today you can hear their echoes.

How often have you heard the old-timers say, "In the Old Corps we got along very well without any classification system." I'm certain that most of us have heard this statement hundreds of times. So let's take a brief look at the Old Corps and see whether or not the old-timers know what they're talking about.

Did they have a classification system in the Old Corps? The answer is a loud, "Yes." It wasn't an elaborate system and it wasn't labeled but it was still a form of classification just the same. Any system in which a person's specialty is identified is definitely classification. The method used in the pre-World War II Marine Corps was the rank-title sys-

tem. We had such rank titles as Assistant Cook, Field Cook, Chief Cook, Paymaster Sergeant, Quartermaster Sergeant, Platoon Sergeant, Gunnery Sergeant, Master Gunnery Sergeant, First Sergeant, Sergeant Major, Field Music, etc.; all which indicated a distinct specialty. Besides the rank titles, the Marine Corps also used different insignia on the chevrons to indicate the individual's particular specialty.

After all, what is personnel classification? Paragraph 6002 of the Marine Corps Manual defines it as follows:

"Personnel Classification is the process of obtaining, recording, and continuously evaluating information required for accurate identification of the military qualifications of personnel, and identifying such qualifications in a standardized manner."

From this definition we can see that the old rank titles were actually a form of personnel classification. So regardless of what anyone says, we had classification long before November 1942 when the "spec numbers" were first introduced into the Marine Corps and the system was labeled Personnel Classification.

As with any new system, procedure or equipment, classification was eyed with suspicion by all who did not understand it, or know why it was devised.

The "940 Card" (the equivalent of the present-day page 10 of the service record book) baffled everybody with its many holes, notches, figures, letters and blocks of information. First sergeants and sergeants major used some salty language in expressing their sentiments on the new system and often ended up by throwing the cards in a wastebasket. They blamed the classification system for misassignments and misfits and any other ills, when actually they should have been placing the blame on themselves for not giving the program a chance.

THIS BRINGS UP a point which applies even to our present-day personnel classification and personnel administration program. Misassignments, erroneous classifications and inequitable promotions are not the fault of the system in use, but rather the fault lies with those who are responsible for the administration of current regulations and instructions. Either through misunderstanding or complete disregard of the instructions, administrators continue to operate according to their own whims. The system will work satisfactorily if those responsible for its administration will let it work rather than fight it.

Let's compare the personnel system with a machine. Any machine is at its best only when operated by a person thoroughly familiar with its various functions and intricate mechanism. If the machine is abused and operated without regard to the manufacturer's instructions, it will soon break down or at least fail to function properly. Likewise, the

personnel system is at its best only when administered in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Marine Corps Manual, MOS Manual and other Marine Corps publications. If these instructions are ignored or misinterpreted, the system will not function properly.

Whose responsibility is it to administer the personnel system in the Marine Corps? Primarily, it is the responsibility of the commanding officers at the basic personnel section level. However, the commanding officer must rely upon junior officers, noncommissioned officers and even the squad leaders and fire team leaders to do their share in making proper assignments and utilizing personnel assigned to them. The CO will depend primarily upon his administrative personnel to assist him in the proper administration of personnel procedures. It is important, therefore, for these people to be thoroughly familiar with current regulations and instructions. They are the actual operators of the administrative "machine" we call Personnel Classification.

WHY WAS IT NECESSARY to turn our backs on the rank-title method of classification? This system seemed adequate in the pre-World War II Marine Corps. However, when the Marine Corps started expanding to many times the personnel strength of the Old Corps, and with the introduction of new and better equipment, new jobs were created which were not identified by any of the old rank titles. New skills were required and personnel with those skills were needed immediately. In order to enable us to pick men who either had these qualifications or who could learn them with a minimum of training, classification interviews and tests were instituted whereby a picture of the individual's abilities and potentialities was obtained. In order to prevent the addition of new rank titles to identify these skills and potentialities, MOS titles and SSNs were introduced.

Our present personnel and classification system, which was placed in use in 1949, is a streamlined revision of the previous system. The revision introduced the present four-digit MOS code numbers which enable us to determine a Marine's military occupational specialty by the code

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number alone. The first two digits identify the occupational field and the last two digits identify the particular MOS within that occupational field.

There are still entirely too many people who think that classification is a separate system which operates completely on its own. Nothing could be further from the truth. Classification is a definite part of personnel administration. It is, in fact, the foundation upon which our entire personnel system rests. No promotions or assignments can be made without first considering classification. Personnel classification is not a goal in itself, but rather it is a method used to reach an objective. What is this objective? Paragraph 6002 of the Marine Corps Manual states the objective very clearly as follows:

"The primary objective of a personnel classification program is the identification of the military qualifications of personnel to facilitate economical and efficient assignment in peace and war."

In other words, the idea is to make it easier for us to place the round pegs in the round holes and the square pegs in the square holes. It is not necessary to interview each replacement when he reports to an organization in order to determine his qualifications for a military job. We need only to look at his MOS to

get that information. Of course, this is true only if the individual is fully qualified in his MOS in all respects. If the Marine is qualified in only certain phases of the work covered by the MOS assigned him, it is a use less gesture to enter the MOS in his records. The commanding officer's responsibility in this respect cannot be over-emphasized. He, or an offcer designated by him, should definitely determine the Marine's qualifications when contemplating a change of MOS or the assignment of an MOS. This is one of the most important points to be remembered if the classification system is to work at its best in the Marine Corps.

ALTHOUGH PART "C" of chapter six of the Marine Corps Manual is very explicit in stating the regulations for assigning, changing and voiding of MOSs of enlisted Marines, it is surprising how often these regulations are violated. One of the most frequent violations is the failure to void the additional MOS whenever a Marine is promoted above the terminal pay grade of the MOS, or whenever he is reduced below the initial pay grade of the MOS. Paragraph 6106 of the Marine Corps Manual is the reference.

Another common administrative error in connection with the voiding of MOSs, either primary or additional, is the failure to comply with the



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instructions contained in paragraph 11211-6 of the Marine Corps Manual. The instructions state that whenever a primary or additional MOS is voided, the voided MOS should be ruled through with one inked line in the Military Occupational Specialties section of page eight of the service record book, and the voiding shall be explained briefly under "Remarks," listing the MOS voided, the date it was voided, the reason for the voiding and the authority for the action. The primary purpose of these remarks is to prevent the re-assignment of that MOS to the individual at some future date in the event that the voiding action was taken because of a physical handicap.

ONE OF THE PRIMARY causes for errors in the assigning, changing and voiding of MOSs seems to stem from a misunderstanding of the meaning of these terms. Here are their definitions:

Assigning a Basic MOS—The act of first recording in the records of an individual, a basic MOS for which he possesses potential.

Assigning a Primary MOS—The act of first recording in the records of an individual, a primary MOS for which he has demonstrated qualifications, such qualifications to be established upon successful fulfillment of the tasks prescribed by

the job description in the MOS Manual.

Changing an MOS—The act of replacing an assigned MOS with another MOS.

Voiding an MOS—The act of removing an MOS from the records of an individual.

Commanding officers have the authority to assign, change and void both primary and additional MOSs of enlisted personnel. However, they must stay within the limitations specified in the MOS Manual and in chapter six of the Marine Corps Manual. In any situation not covered in those instructions or in some other Marine Corps publication, authority must be obtained from the Commandant of the Marine Corps before any action can be taken.

One of the things which seems to give administrators a lot of trouble is the changing of a Marine's MOS, particularly when the man's new MOS does not indicate competence in his former specialty. The tendency is to rule out the old MOS on page eight of the service record book and record the new one, making no other entries to show what disposition was made of the old. This, in effect, constitutes the removal of an MOS from the individual's records (which is a voiding action) and would require an entry in the "Remarks" section of page eight of the service record book and, in most cases, would require the authority of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Let's say, for instance, that a sergeant with the primary of 0141,* Administrative Clerk, has been performing his duties satisfactorily for several years at which time he is designated as Navy Mail Clerk in accordance with the provisions of part "B" of chapter 23 of the Marine Corps Manual. His primary MOS is then changed to 0161, Postal Clerk. What should we do with his former MOS? The new MOS does not indicate competence in the old one and the Marine hasn't lost his abilities as a clerk just because he has a new MOS as primary. There is nothing in the manual which states that whenever a Marine is assigned a new MOS as primary, his old will be voided. Therefore, it cannot be voided without the approval of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The commanding officer has but one course to follow and that is to assign the old MOS as an additional MOS.


It is very desirable that an individual's military qualifications in other than his primary MOS be indicated in his records in order that these qualifications may be utilized by the Marine Corps. So, whenever the commanding officer changes a Marine's primary MOS to one which does not indicate competence in the old MOS, the old MOS should be assigned as additional.

There are, of course, many common errors in connection with the present personnel system, especially in the assignment phase of the program. Chapter seven of the Marine Corps Manual deals with assignments in the Marine Corps and, I believe, the regulations are clearly enough written so that they can be understood by anyone who will bother to read them.

I DON'T MAINTAIN that classification is the cure-all for the ills of the Marine Corps and the assignment problems. It is, however, a good pallative to help ease the pains somewhat. We can't, for instance, assure anyone that a Marine will complete satisfactorily a course of instruction at a certain service school. However, we can, by evaluating his general classification test scores, pick a Marine who has the capability to complete the course of instruction. If the individual is shiftless and just doesn't give a "hoot" whether or not he completes the course, he can fail it in spite of a high general classification test score. That score merely indicates his ability to learn and is not a guarantee against failure.

If we are to have a good personnel management program in the Marine Corps, it is essential that we have a good classification and assignment program as a tool with which to maintain it. Furthermore, and perhaps even more important, it is necessary that this program be administered faithfully and in the spirit intended. We cannot afford to play the part of die-hards and keep insisting that we can get along much better without it.

Ed: MOSs used are taken from revised
 MOS tables to be put into effect this spring.





So You're Going to Korea. Chances are you'll be a leader. In Korea—even during the armistice—you'll be closer to a fire fight than will Marines anywhere else in the world. Your Marine Corps training has equipped you to perform well in a fire fight. But what about the leadership problems you'll face after the fire fight?

You know what to do when you get an order to attack. You've been taught troop leading steps you must follow to make sure you don't forget anything. You've had hammered into your mind a check list to guide you safely through all the offensive steps until re-organization on the objective is complete. If the order is to organize and defend, you follow another SOP.

Obviously, these aspects of your leadership training had to be emphasized. Leadership training for after the fire fight was necessarily academic. Therefore, it's in the noncombat realm that you have most to learn about leadership.

The non-combat functions of leadership in the Korean static defense (and it's still static defense during the armistice) give leaders more trouble than leading troops in a fire fight. Static defense gives a peculiar twist to the leadership problems that always face leaders in garrison or conventional warfare. These twists present challenges different from any the Corps has faced since the trench warfare of World War I.

Basic leadership techniques apply equally well in positional warfare of the Korean variety. However, certain techniques must be emphasized in the parade-ground atmosphere that sometimes hangs over the Korean battlefield.

LtCol John J. Wiggins, Executive Officer of the 7th Marines, heard an unidentified Marine colorfully define this atmosphere. The Marine, unaware that the colonel was listening, was pulling out through "Item Valley" on the east coast of Korea as the 1st Marine Division moved west in March 1952. He said, "This is some blanking war. You go out on a blanking patrol. You get in a

blanking fire fight. You knock off a few blanking Commies. A coupla' our guys get hit. Word comes to move out. What's the blanking lieutenant say? Pick up your blanking brass!"

After the fire fight such an air always settles over forces in a static situation. And, as you'll see, quite properly so.

After the fire fight your first thoughts as a leader may go to the morale of your unit. You are well aware of the elements that make morale high in any unit. You know that an individual's morale is good when he feels he is accomplishing something, when he feels needed, when he feels that he is being "looked out for" and given individual consideration by a leader who understands him.

Your unit has just performed well in a patrol fire fight. Possibly some of your men were hit. You know that in the let-down after the climax of the action some men will begin to wonder whether the patrol's accomplishments were great enough to compensate for their wounded buddies. Your company commander knows this too. So, even though you and your men are dead tired, he conducts a detailed debriefing. He has to have certain information for battalion but he exaggerates a little. He phrases his questions to make the action of every man seem important. Every man is left with the feeling that what he saw and what he did was important — that he helped accomplish something vital.

That's a sample of the special consideration required to maintain a high standard of morale in the static defense. On the offensive, Marine units have constant evidence that they are doing a good job. In addition, they have the incentive of a terrain objective in sight. Such an envisioned objective is a great morale factor. In the static defense the boost of a successful combat mission doesn't come often. Inherently a static defense has no end in view; so the only short-range objective an individual contemplates is rotation of his unit into a reserve status; the



Tight living demands clean positions

only long-range goal, individual rotation to the states.

Looming large as a morale problem are false rumors - easily generated and rapidly spread in static situations. A rumor that 17th Replacement Draft personnel would be rotated after six months in Korea suddenly caught hold in the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. I was in a position to watch two Marines who, refusing to believe it was false information, wrote their wives about the early rotation and began to plan on departing by a certain date. Their morale was crushed and their effectiveness reduced when the date rolled around and found not only the 17th draft, but the 14th, 15th and 16th still manning the line.

To combat such rumors, you must pass on to your troops all official information received. Rumors must be checked immediately. If they contain truth, you must elevate these rumors to the status of fact by your action; if they contain no truth, you must squelch them.

Marines have been trained to capture ground. Capturing ground is not normally compatible with the static defense. Marines won't question any order to take and hold a piece of terrain. But they have questions in their minds (though they may never be voiced) when they have to sustain casualties patrolling and raiding forward when there is no mission to capture and hold ground. You should answer their "whys" as honestly as possible. This fact demands that the static-war leader be on his toes more than in conventional warfare. In this kind of war you must keep abreast of current aims of higher echelons, you must know the tactical reasons for each patrol and raid and your orders must "make sense" to your subordinates. More than in conventional warfare, you must make a great show of cheerfully carrying out each order. The static defense leader must — more than any other leader—be constantly optimistic. Pessimism is infectious in such situations and can contribute to low morale.

Vacations from fighting in the form of rest and recreation trips (commonly R&R) to Seoul, Ascom City or Japan are among the "fringe benefits" to morale. So are the numerous USO, Marine and Army Special Services shows. Few benefits of this type are available in any other kind of warfare. You can hurt rather than help morale if you fail to award to the most deserving men R&R or the privilege of going to the rear for a few hours to see a show.

With the fire fight behind you for the moment, you give this morale problem more thought. You conclude that it can't be isolated. Every other aspect of your leadership in the static defense has a bearing on the morale of your unit.

AFTER THE FIRE FIGHT the first tangible problem you come to grips with is likely to be one of police and sanitation.

The 1st Marine Division surgeon earned the name "Dr. Rattis-rattus." He won that title at division staff briefings where he constantly gave accounts of the battle being waged to kill rats in the division sector of responsibility. He had much support in this campaign. I've heard regimental commanders order that the anti-rat program be considered second only to killing the enemy. This is perfectly reasonable when you consider the ravages that could be wrought in a static situation if an epidemic of typhus developed. Rats are attracted to trenches and bunkers when food particles or other filth accumulates. And rats carry typhus! These facts alone show the importance of strict police discipline and police consciousness in a static defense-particularly in the Orient

where epidemics are prevalent.

In an offensive you move off and leave the few items that aren't conered in a trash pit. Filth doesn't pile up because you're always on the move. Not so in positional warfare. You clean up carefully, or you live under unsanitary conditions. You must demand severe police measures to meet the high standards required in static situations.

Police and sanitation have a lot to do with the morale of your unit. Good leadership can produce the ideal result. Second Lieutenant Max J. Hochenauer, 1st Platoon, Fox Company, 7th Marines, proved this. Inspecting officers from regiment and battalion noted that they could detect the superiority of Hochenauer's area when they got inside his limiting points, even when they didn't know these points on the ground. His area was always in perfect police and everyone was on the ball. Lookouts from concealed positions were scanning their assigned sectors of observation oblivious of inspecting officers.

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This platoon fought like it held police call—superbly. That will be the case with your unit, too. If you let it be sloppy on police and sanitation, it will be sloppy in a fire fight.

Another problem you'll face is keeping your men in appropriate uniform. Again there are tangible reasons for your exerting the right kind of leadership technique here. Also there is the intangible effect on morale. If your men don't get to gether on the uniform of the day, they won't get together when you signal "Commence firing."

It seems peculiar that keeping in uniform is a problem of leadership in a combat situation. It is a definite problem in the static defense though. Principally "uniform" means helmet and armored vest when forward of the battalion CP carrying a weapon at all times and clean, unfrayed utilities when practicable.

In this case, as in all others, you have only to enforce logic. The helmet and vest save lives. The clean uniform keeps down disease. By the time a utility uniform is frayed, it is faded to the point that it can't be used on night operations because it can be seen in the dark like a white

sheet. Besides, frayed garments get caught in weapons — what an alibi for stoppages!

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Like police and sanitation, and for the same reason, personal hygiene is especially important in the fixed Korean situation. You must make certain your men get back to the showers regularly and that they have clean clothes. When showers and clean clothes are not supplied by a service unit, you must find other means to maintain acceptable standards of cleanliness.

Most commanders require that all hands shave every day in Korea. I served in one battalion which required officers to shave daily and the men at least once every two days.

In Korea, clothing must be impregnated against certain insects. Utility coat sleeves must be kept buttoned to keep out the same bugs. These are merely more of the details that you must logically interpret to your subordinates while requiring compliance.

One unusual thing about the Korean situation is the large number of personnel you're likely to find attached to your unit. A classic example is the rifle platoon which was defending the Chang-dan corridor before the armistice. It had nearly a hundred men attached, including 75mm recoilless, rocket and heavy and light machine gun personnel.

If you get a platoon like that, it will be your job to weld the people attached into a team. You'll still be responsible for everything that goes on between your limiting points. That means you'll have to make sure that the camouflage discipline, police and sanitation discipline, etc., is maintained by your attached, as well as your organic, personnel.

These personnel give you added problems of logistics. In the static defense where there is an almost unbelievable amount of hot food, PX supplies, beer and coke rations, show tickets and special cold weather gear to pass out, attached personnel present a problem. You must include all attached personnel in the distribution of these items. Each man attached must get the same "issue" as an organic man. This is the only way you can insure that every Marine gets a fair shake and that everyone feels he is a part of your team.

This team idea is a good one for you to fix in your mind right here.

That's because regardless of the rank of the attached personnel, the responsibility for holding your platoon position is still yours.

The colonel I was accompanying on a tour of the lines asked a lieutenant, "How many frag grenades do you have?" The platoon leader replied, "About three hundred, sir"

The colonel then heatedly explained to the lieutenant that, as the one man in command of that platoon, he should know exactly the number of grenades and other ammunition he had on position, how much chow, how much construction material, and so on.

This regimental commander put similar questions to leaders all along the company MLR that morning. Every time he heard the word "about," he stopped to give the same little lecture.

This same colonel, the regimental commander, had earlier detailed one of his staff officers to check up on the rather haphazard way a certain squad repulsed a small enemy probe. The staff officer found a "snafu" supply situation. The squad leader said he could have slaughtered the few attackers if he'd had the grenades he'd asked the lieutenant about a few days earlier. The lieutenant said he had plenty of them "he thought." The company said it had turned down no requests.

As a static defense leader, you must keep a constant eye on supply and you must know the answers! That rule applies to everything from shoe sizes and rocket rounds to armored vests and mosquito nets.

Some on-the-ball leaders solved this problem by using specially designed notebooks to keep supply details up to date. They supplemented this information with bunker check lists. These bunker lists showed a running inventory of all important items in the bunker.

Supply discipline is a provoking problem in this type of operation. Instead of advancing into an unknown logistical situation, as in the case of most conventional attacks, Marines after a static defense raid know they will return to a "fat" supply dump inside their well-developed battle position. It takes real leadership to inspire every man to lug every item of his equipment "the last mile home."

Fire discipline will be closely related to supply discipline in your unit. Don't let your men waste ammunition. You can use the time and effort they'll have to expend replenishing your supply.

Some troops won't readily see the logic of aggressive training during the armistice — or during any static defense. To counter this natural tendency, leaders must insert imagination and realism into training problems. The training must be made interesting so that it will appeal to the men, whether they see the logic in it or not. However, part of the training program should be devoted to explaining why extensive and aggressive training is always necessary in the Corps.

Well-planned, well-executed training can be turned into a morale booster rather than a morale buster.

Although the list of leadership problems is inexhaustible, if you consider the things discussed here and place them in the proper perspective, you're likely to be an extremely effective leader in Korea. Half the battle is won when you place your aggressive combat training under your belt, while giving proper importance to the many unique details of leadership that arise after the fire fight—a situation that requires leadership-with-a-difference.

Coronas or parkas, each man must get the same "issue"



Marine artillerymen had to fight for a chance to man their guns

By MSgt Edward J. Evans

Time on

IN HIS TRADITIONAL ROLE OF SOLdier of the Sea, the United States Marine has often found it necessary to be a military Jack-of-all-trades. Being called upon to serve as infantryman or artilleryman, often simultaneously, has been no unusual experience. Marines made the acquaintance of heavy weapons during their first cruise and have never permitted the friendship to wane.

From the earliest days of Marine Corps history the Leathernecks have been called upon to man naval guns aboard ship and artillery pieces ashore. Since the Corps had such excellent dual-purpose training from the beginning, the Continental Congress turned to it at a time when skilled gunners were desperately needed by General Washington. Major Samuel Nicholas and his three companies of infantry were ordered to artillery duty with the Continental Army from February 1st to July 1st, 1777 and served with distinction at the battles of Trenton and Princeton.

During its formative years, the Corps didn't see any need for having separate branches of infantry and artillery. Marines were expected to

as needed. The battalion marched 80 miles from Washington to St. Leonards Creek, near the mouth of the Patuxent River. Here they met the British on June 25th and by artillery fire forced the withdrawal of the frigates Narcissus and Loire. It was this same Marine artillery combined with Navy gunners which put up a magnificent defense at Bladensburg before being over-run.

Proposals were frequently made concerning the expansion of artillery training in the Marine Corps. In 1814, an officer wrote the Secretary of the Navy recommending that, "The Corps of Marines should be instructed in the discipline of both infantry and artillery," and that there should also be appointed, "a master of ordnance, whose duty it should be to instruct the men in the practice of gunnery and to take care of the cannon, mortars and howitzers attached to the Corps."

Nothing was done immediately about this suggestion, but in 1825 a group of 25 Marine officers addressed a petition to the Secretary of the Navy requesting that artillery training be included in the regular instruction of the Marine Corps in or-

During the Indian war of 1836-37, he also commanded Army artillery and constantly urged that the Marines be similarly trained. In a report on the subject to the Secretary of the Navy, he wrote, "The artillery drill, especially that of light artillery, would be especially beneficial in case of landing a force in a forceign country."

The employment of amphibious artillery in the Florida Indian war provided an enlightening and humorous incident for the record. The Indians had captured a key off the Florida coast, and a small detachment of Marines and seamen was sent to retake it. Commanded by an ensign, the five able-bodied men and eight volunteers from the sick list loaded several 4-pounder cannon on a barge and set out. Although the landing was to be made under the surprise effect of gunfire, the Indians were very much on the alert and prepared for defense. The nature of the craft for the mission proved costly, as the ensign reported: "At the third discharge, being obliged to fire athwartships, our guns rebounded overboard." The Marines and seamen captured the

on Target

177 years

double in brass as the occasion arose.

One of the first shore detachments of United States Marines to be equipped with artillery was that ordered by President Madison to establish a post on Cumberland Island off the coast of Georgia. The detachment of 47 men and two officers boasted two 6-pounder field guns with which to defend their island.

Two months before the Battle of Bladensburg, a battalion of Marine artillery was formed and sent into the field by the Secretary of the Navy. Captain Samuel Miller, of the Washington Marine Barracks, was ordered to take all available mounted field pieces and suitable equipment for infantry or artillery action

der to prepare it for broader functions. Progress is made slowly, but in this matter red tape must have been painful for those who promoted the cause of artillery. It wasn't until December 1841, that the Secretary took official notice of the matter and included in his annual report the proposal that each ship of the fleet should have no less than one Marine assigned to each gun crew. Again there were delays and it was nearly a year later that Commandant Archibald Henderson directed the assignment of one Marine private to each Navy gun crew aboard ship.

During the 40 years BrigGen Henderson was Commandant, he had ample opportunity to study the effectiveness of artillery in small wars.

island despite the loss of their artillery.

A definite artillery program seemed imminent by 1857, when Commandant Henderson reported to the Secretary of the Navy: "First Lieutenant Greene, with your approval, passed a large portion of the summer at West Point engaged in securing a knowledge of artillery for the purpose of introducing it into the Marine Corps. A battery of light and heavy guns, directed by the department to be turned over to the Marine Corps, will in a few days be at Headquarters, and instruction in artillery will immediately thereafter commence."

This artillery school at Marine Corps Headquarters was the topic of the times just prior to the outbreak of the Civil War, for the firepower of many naval vessels of that day was increased by the addition of all-Marine gun crews.

The value of this increased usage of Marine gun crews is exemplified by this report from the USS Susquehanna: "First Lieutenant William Wallace, with his fine company of Marines, handled effectively the two extra 9-inch guns during the first attack on Fort Fisher, December 24th, 1864."

With the establishment of the School of Application at Headquarters in 1891, came the realization of an old dream. Artillery instruction, at least, was on a permanent basis.

There was now at least a foundation of men trained in the fundamentals of artillery upon which to build when the opportunity came. Not only did that opportunity appear shortly, but it arose three-fold in the form of the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection and the Boxer Rebellion. Marines were given 3-inch naval guns converted into rapid-fire field pieces, and one company of each battalion was organized as artillery.

Later came the Nicaraguan campaign and Marine artillery got a new chance to test its mettle. In 1912, Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton made the following report: "Two companies of artillery with 3-inch field guns went into action at Covotepe. Promptly at 0800, firing was opened by Butler from the southeast with three field guns, and by Underwood's battery from the northeast with two 3-inch field guns. Ranges varied in the case of both batteries from 1,500 to 2,500 yards with considerable damage to the enemy's earthwork redoubts at both Barranca and Coyotepe."

A long-range plan for the formation of a Marine Advanced Base Force had been slowly and thoroughly evolved by Marine officers who felt that the Corps could serve the Navy more effectively if it were trained and equipped to operate tactically as an independent unit with its own artillery and supporting arms. From the beginning of World War I the plan had been under favorable consideration by the Navy Department.

By June 1917, orders were sent out from Washington to commence



The '20s — campaign hats and French 75s

organization of this force to protect naval bases in France or the Caribbean. Artillery units were to include four batteries of 5-inch naval guns, a battalion of light field artillery and two anti-aircraft batteries.

One light artillery battalion, equipped with the Navy 3-inch field gun, went into training at Quantico in May 1917. A battery of 4.7-inch guns was later joined, but although the battalion trained to perfection, the possibility of the Advance Base Force being given a major war mission continued to fade. The last hope that the Marine artillery might be sent to France to augment the Marine infantry brigade was crushed when the Army notified the Marine Corps that only 75mm guns were being used and no artillery was needed from the Corps.

The 10th Marines came into existence on January 14, 1918, and absorbed all artillery units then in training at Quantico. The regiment continued to train with 3-inch guns until transferred to the Naval Ordnance proving ground at Indian Head, Maryland.

In the meantime the 11th Marines had also been organized as an artillery regiment and had requisitioned guns from the Army to train one battalion as anti-aircraft. Only enough weapons were received to equip one battery. After the end of the war, one battalion remained in training with the 3-inch field guns. Of the weapons ordered in 1918, the Corps received only a few 75mm and 155mm guns long after the Armistice. These served as the foundation for the long period of planning and training that preceded World War II.

In the interim period between World Wars I and II the Marine Corps went through re-organization pains, but, by 1920, arrangements had been made to send a few Marine officers to the Army Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Even through 1921, however, it was doubtful as to the continued existence of the remaining two battalions of French 75s and 155mm guns.

Fortunately the proponents of artillery won out and an artillery school was established at Quantico.

During the late 1920s, tests were being conducted on a new type gun admirably suited to the needs of Marine artillery in amphibious operations. This 75mm pack howitzer, originally designed as a mountain gun and easily broken down for horse loads, was recognized by farseeing officers as the ideal landing gun because it could be unloaded by hand from the standard ships' boats -the only ones available at the time. Approval was won in 1930, and by 1931 the 10th Marines were able to begin replacement of their French 75mm field artillery.

For many years the 10th Marines existed as the only artillery regiment in the Marine Corps. It was based at Quantico until 1933, when the new Fleet Marine Force was formed. Two brigades of the FMF were set up at Quantico and San Diego, with the 10th Marines split to serve both.

With the approach of war in Europe again, extensive expansion and re-organization took place in the Corps. The East and West Coast Expeditionary Forces became the 1st and 2d Marine Brigades. Late in 1939, the two anti-aircraft battalions then in existence, together with the brigades, provided trained personnel for the new defense battalions. The 1st and 2d Defense Battalions were formed at San Diego.

and the 3d at Parris Island.

Marine defense battalions charecterized the flexibility prevalent in the Corps. In size, these defense batvalions were often as large if not larger than a regiment. They were the all-purpose artillery of the Marine Corps. In their formative stages, all sorts of odds and ends of ordnance were scraped together to arm them. The special-weapons groups used .30 and .50 caliber machine guns, anti-aircraft batteries fired the nearly obsolete 3-inch guns and the seacoast batteries had World War I French 155mm rifles, or 5-inch and 7-inch naval guns.

The mission of the defense battalions was simple — defend a naval base against sea and air attack. To accomplish this mission infantry and tank companies were sometimes attached.

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The expansion of the 1st and 2d Brigades had brought about their redesignation as divisions by 1940. The 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, at Quantico, was redesignated 11th Marines and assigned to the new lst Division. Deployment for possible future involvement in hostilities took the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines and the 5th Defense Battalion to Iceland in July 1941. The 1st Defense Battalion had sailed out to Pearl Harbor and part of it detached for duty on ill-fated Wake Island. The 3d Defense set up installations on Midway Island. It was relieved by the 6th which figured in the battle that helped turn the tide of the Pacific war.

Samoa was one of the first staging areas of the Pacific, and the first artillery unit to arrive there was the 7th Defense Battalion in March 1941. The 4th Defense Battalion remained in training at Pearl Harbor. When the attack by the Japanese came, these units were among the first to see action.

The old axiom that all Marines are infantry first and specialists second was well applied to the artillery-

1918 - 8-inch howitzers



men, as it frequently became necessary to take defensive action against enemy patrols and snipers. An outstanding example was the battle for "Edson's Ridge," September 1942. The 11th Marines' 5th Battalion of 105s worked in close support of the 1st Raider and 1st Parachute Battalions in a vicious eight-hour fight. In October the full strength of division artillery was thrown into action at the Matanikau River, where for the first time artillery alone stopped an enemy tank-led advance.

On Peleliu the 3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion landed with the infantry in an area 200 yards square and for a time had to fire in three directions simultaneously with the guns trail to trail. On D+17 the artillerymen were ordered into the lines as infantry for eight days, with two batteries in the lines for 15 days.

The 3d, 5th, 9th and 11th De-

support at Peleliu, Leyte, Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

During the same years of organizational development, changes were also made in ordnance. Anti-air-craft units replaced the obsolete 3-inch guns with the newer and more powerful 90mm dual-purpose guns. Former seacoast units received highly mobile, new 155mm rifles and howitzers in place of the 5- and 7-inch naval guns or French 155s previously used. Rapid-fire 20- and 40-mm guns had replaced machine guns in the special-weapons sections of the AA battalions.

By 1945, all the field artillery regiments had received hard-hitting 105mm howitzers in place of the little 75mm pack howitzers. In 20 days on Iwo Jima, the 3d Battalion, 13th Marines fired 103,776 rounds into Japanese positions. The 2d Battalion, 13th Marines stopped a




The '30s — tin hats and pack howitzers

fense Battalions served extensively through the Solomons campaign as anti-aircraft and heavy artillery attached to the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions. This became standard employment for these battalions once the need for solely defensive measures had passed. With such employment, a new role was being created for them and eventually the old defense battalions were split up and redesignated. Seacoast artillery groups were detached from defense battalions in 1944 and retrained as separate 155mm gun or howitzer battalions. The remaining units of the old defense organizations were renamed anti-aircraft battalions.


With additional heavy artillery drawn from the defense battalions' seacoast sections, four more 155mm howitzer battalions and six 155mm gun battalions were organized and provided heavy, long-range artillery banzai attack with 1,500 rounds fired in one hour and 50 minutes.

Self-propelled artillery appeared in the form of tank-destroyers assigned to infantry regimental weapons companies. The 105mm self-propelled guns were used on Okinawa in cave-busting operations. Received too late to get into action, the new self-propelled 155mm guns were used for training and demonstration. Rocket launchers, as a new form of artillery, came into their own during the last campaigns and earned a permanent place in the organization.

Action in Korea wrote the most recent chapter and in this last analysis, Marine artillerymen have proved themselves to be versatile, resourceful and effective—able to take their guns into jungle swamps, or mountain snow, and to fire missions that previously had been considered impossible.







ILLUSTRATIONS FROM BETTMANN ARCHIVE

IT IS NOT SO LONG AGO THAT THE story was going the rounds of the proud war-time mother who was heard to explain, "Yes, all my boys are overseas; two of them fighting and one on the staff."

The mild little jape still gets its modest tribute of laughter; but the devil of it is that now, as always, it is laughter edged with more than a hint of rankling malice. It is questionable, indeed, if "the Olympians of the Staff" have ever been anything but the object of a thinly-veiled ridicule in which mockery is but the superficial expression of a deep, unflagging undertow of resentment.

It is the natural instinct of all free men to kick against authority; or, as General Patton once put it, "All human beings have an innate resistance to obedience."

But if the respective authors of The Young Lions and The Naked and the Dead are to be believed—and there is no conceivable reason to question their integrity, or that of any other novelist writing in similar vein—the average American has taken so faithfully to heart Walt Whitman's challenging recommendation to "Resist much, obey little," that the characteristic is subjugated with extreme difficulty even when he

takes his place in his country's armed forces.

In some ways, this is no more than to be expected; for as Hans Delbrück has pointed out, "Every people is the child of its history, its past, and can no more break away from it than a man can separate himself from his youth." And the whole American story is founded on the successful repudiation of authority—the authority a British Parliament sought to clamp down on a virile, up-and-coming people.

In the Fighting Services "the High-Ups of the Staff" embody the ultimate equation of authority, and that fact alone tends, almost automatically, to render them suspect in libertarian eyes. ("Are you voting Democrat or Republican?" the canvasser demanded of a hill-billy from the remoter Ozarks and instantly came the response, "Whoever's in, I'm agin 'em!") But the fact that "the High-Ups" represent something that cannot be argued with serves most dangerously to obscure the consideration that they also stand for a good deal more.

"An army," as General J. F. C. Fuller has so vividly pointed out, "is a three-fold organization, comprising a body—its combatant arms, a stomach—its administrative services and a brain—its command. The destruction of any one of these," he concludes, "renders the other two inoperable." And the "stomach" and "brain" are the direct responsibility of "the Olympians of the Staff."

WITHOUT A PLAN to direct and co-ordinate his activities, the fightingman is simply a gift to the enemy, the army of which he forms a part no more than a prostrate giant. It is the prime responsibility of "the Olympians" to furnish him with a plan which combines the greatest probability of victory with the minimum hazard of life and limb. In actual fact, in nine cases out of 10 they can do no more than evolve a plan which leaves a great deal more than they would like to chance and such imponderables of the battlefield as the degree of enemy resistance, the incidence of the weather and the morale of the most dubious element amongst the troops on which they have to rely. For as there is no perfect plan and no perfect battle, so there will always be troops whose fighting quality-through fatigue, over-heavy recent casualties, a disproportionate infusion of "new blood," or a sustained streak of bad luck—is a little less than the mean average. In effect, "the High-Ups" do the best they can in the specific circumstances and with the particular means at their disposal. And be it ever borne in mind that when things go right it is the front-line troops who claim all the credit; the staff is only remembered when things go wrong!

The soldier, however, only fights intermittently; but he is hungry—with great punctuality—on an aver-



Hargreaves

age of three times a day; and, quite rightly, "raises hell" if his needs go unappeased. But it is rare for him to reflect by what miracles of planning, contrivance and inspired improvisation his appetites—as those of his weapons during actual combat—are assuaged. For again, the man in the front line takes for granted the punctual arrival of his innumerable necessities; and the staff is only brought to mind, to be roundly anathematised, in the occasional hour of shortage.

The prosecution of war is founded upon a pyramid of descending authority; its broad base being composed of the men who actually fire the guns and charge home with the bayonet; its lonely pinnacle occupied by the supreme commander, who plans and directs the whole enterprise; with a downward devolu-

tion of responsibility extending w the latest "lance Jack" to be awarded his single strip of "tape." Since even generals, however exalted, sulfer from the human inability to be in two places at once, it follows that the devolution of some of their authority accompanies the delegation of a considerable proportion of their work to the members of their staffwhat might be termed, for the sake of convenience, the "Lesser Olympians." With the enormous expansion and complication that war has undergone with the coming of the magazine rifle, the breech-loading gun and all that is embodied in the term "mechanization," such delegation of authority is as progressive as it is inevitable.

But it cannot be too emphatically or too clearly emphasized that the "Lesser Olympians" speak only with

he voice of the commander they represent; that for everything the staff officer may say or do-or may fail to do or say-his superior must accept the ultimate responsibility. It is, then, the prime responsibility of the "Lesser Olympians" to help in the erection, and subsequently to interpret and aid in the execution, of the plans of their commander. Moreover, it is only a thoroughly smooth-working executive-cum-administration that will serve to free the commander from those tedious matters of routine, too great a preoccupation with which would rob him of all opportunity to devise those means of overcoming the enemy which constitutes his primary responsibility. Equally, it is for the staff officer always to remember that it is only by the accumulation and subsequent collation of evidence-both as to the condition and potentialities of his own troops as of those of the enemy-that the commander can formulate his plans.

Von Moltke and his staff: "Olympians" at their peak



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The second and equally important obligation of the "Lesser Olympians" is to function as an everactive link between the needs of the troops and those channels of supply, direction and encouragement through which they can be satisfied.

It will be seen that Sir John French was scarcely exaggerating when he pronounced that "The role of the Staff Officer is one of selfeffacement and unselfishness."

Contrary to what would appear to be the popular belief, the staff was not devised, in the first instance, by a malignant Providence as an abiding torment for the ordinary regimental soldier. They were an ineludible accompaniment to the evolution of warfare from a scrambling foray in search of plunder and new hunting grounds to an infinitely intricate and highly organized attempt on the part of a modern nation to impose its will on an enemy.

In the remote day of tribal warfare, that horde warfare of which Genghis Khan was perhaps the prime exemplar, the need of a properly co-ordinated staff had not yet arisen. Pursuing elementary tactics on a relatively limited battlefield. the leader could personally direct and control the course of events. The need for a "G," or operational, staff did not exist. Equally, in those halcyon days when an entire campaign could be carried through without a single word being put down on paper,1 the necessity for an "A and Q," or administrative, staff was scarcely more apparent. With a field army whose problem of subsistence was solved by the simple if sometimes rather chancy—process of "living on the country," at the most logistics demanded no more than that the pool of provisions ac cumulated by the foraging parties should undergo reasonably equitable distribution.

The same obligation applied, at least in theory, in share-out of loot.²



With the increase in size and greater diversity of composition which characterized the medieval army, there arose a progressive need for the creation of something on the lines of a properly departmentalized staff. To give immediate assistance to the Sovereign, or "Lord general" appointed in his place, the posts of Marshal and Constable were created: two functionaries whose duties correspond, approximately, to those of the present-day Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General. Next in the hierarchy came the Serjeant-Major General, a drill expert and one skilled in forming "battle-array," i.e. in deploying the troops in their battle formations, ready to go into action. (Incidentally, it is worth while to recall that in 1565, when senior officers petitioned to be awarded some higher designation than that of "Captain," the suggestion was adopted that they should henceforth be known as "Colonel"from the Italian colonello or columna - with the officer next below them styled "Serjeant-Major." It is from the latter title that we get the abbreviated "Major" of today. The medieval second-in-command, or Serjeant-Major, the only infantry officer to remain mounted in action, also performed many of the duties now associated with the adjutant.)

AMONGST THE "Lesser Olympians" the expansion of medieval armies brought into being must be counted the Muster-Master, whose duty was to check the "returns" of the effectives "borne on the strength:" while the Scout-Master was another important functionary, whose activities, including reconnaissance, interrogation of prisoners, espionage and

schatzung paid over by a city to save it from being sacked. That was collected in bulk and shared on a varying scale, according to rank.

¹Presumably this is what soldiers refet to when they speak of "the good old days!" ²Ransom, however, was a strictly individual business, save in the case of the *Brand*-

contra-espionage, faithfully anticipated the work of "Intelligence" as it is performed today. Hand in glove with the Waggon-Master, responsible for all questions of transport and remounts, worked the Chief Herberger, subsequently known as the Commissary of Victuals. Rather a lone wolf was the Master of the Ordnance, in whose keeping reposed the various siege engines and all warlike stores. Even more varied were the duties of the Provost Marshal, responsible as he was for camp discipline, the safe custody of prisoners and-most onerous task of all -the control of the motley throng of camp followers, who frequently outnumbered the troops by three to

Here was the embryo of a staff, in the main performing similar functions to those of the "Lesser Olympians" today.

→ THE GREATER MOBILITY and range given to warfare by the introduction of gunpowder and weapons of precision, and the consequent abandonment of body-armor-with a resultant increase in speed and maneuverability on the part of the cavalrynecessitated the organization of a small staff of "gallopers," by whose instrumentality orders could be transmitted to the remoter areas of the battlefield. French in origin (mention of them is to be found from the end of the 16th century onwards) they were given the name of aides-de-camp, and, speedily mounted, acted as the delegated "voices" who conveyed the orders of their Generalissimo to his subordinate commanders. Trained to the exacting task of repeating directives with absolute accuracy, they had also to inform themselves of their superior's intentions, so that the interpretation of orders could be checked, or even amplified, on the spot, should the need arise. In these hard-riding juniors can be found the embryo of the "Lesser Olympians" (Operations) down to divisional and brigade level, of today.

A little later the regiment or brigade group acquired its own allocation of "Lesser Olympians" in the form of the Brigade-Major; while the battalion staff was represented by the Aide-Major, performing the functions now associated with the adjutant. In addition, the regimental staff included a quartermaster, surgeon, clerk and chaplain; although these functionaries scarcely qualify for inclusion even amongst the "Lesser Olympians." Indeed, the last three were no more than the colonel's servants, appointed by him and receiving their remuneration out of his private purse.

But, as will be seen, with amplified numbers and increasing organizational complexity, the need to devolute authority had created a "chain of command" in which duly appointed "voices," in a descending scale, spoke in the name of the central authority. In short, "the High-Ups" functioned through the "Lesser Olympians," to convey the inten-

tions and orders upon which all military enterprises must be founded.

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It was not, however, until some hundreds of years of trial and error had passed into the Ewigkeit that full appreciation was given to the fact that specialist work demands specialist training. Up to the last quarter of the 18th century no more than the minimum of institutions for the specific training of staff off. cers can be said to have existed. Men had been selected for staff appointments either because they early demonstrated a marked aptitude for the work or because influence had contrived to foist them into the particular billet they occupied. In the first category, Cadogan, the great



Hargreaves

Living on the country - no G-4 needed

Duke of Marlborough's right hand man, was a staff officer of such natural talent that it is questionable if any academic training would have served to enhance his native abilities. Moreover, he served under a supreme commander whose genius for staff work was only equalled by his skill in battle-direction and his resource in diplomacy. Baron von Steuben-Washington's John Moore, as he has aptly been termed-had learned his business as a staff officer in the hard school of Frederick the Great. That he combined the practical experience of the old-time Serjeant-Major General with the academic technique of a Jomini or a Helmuth von Moltke, is abundantly witnessed by his success in troop training at Valley Forge and his eminently useful contribution to the tricky action at Monmouth on the one hand, and on the other the im-

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Emperor's intricate staff apparatus. It is not given to many men to excel at the head of troops and on the staff; although no field commander can hope for continuing success without a full appreciation of the staff organization upon which victory is founded. Heaven help the man who cannot or will not decentralize, and tries to do it all himself!

In the main, the competent 18th century staff officer had learned his business the hard way, by trial and error in actual warfare. For while training for regimental soldiering could be sought at the Ecole Militaire in France, Spain's Segovia establishment and the academies at Vienna and Turin, save at the Berlin Kriegsschule and the Ecole Supérieur de la Guerre at Grenoble, no instructional institution for the enlightenment of the would-be staff officer was to be found. It was all

down the principles for its organization, the staff that took the field with the Napoleon of the later campaigns was an extremely reliable instrument of war.

With her inveterate love of amateurism, it was some time before England followed suit, with the foundation of an extremely modest establishment whose purpose was the induction of the aspiring student into the mysteries of staff work. This was inaugurated in 1799, at the little Buckinghampshire township of High Wycombe; where 30 "learners" assembled under the argus eye of the Gallic theoretician, M. de Jarry, once the light of the Berlin Kriegsschule. But despite the good work done by Jarry's pupils throughout the Peninsular War³ and the removal of the instructional organization to Sandhurst, it was not until 1870 that the Staff College blos-



Bettmann

Baron von Steuben at Valley Forge - Frederick the Great had taught him well

peccable quality of his written orders at Yorktown.


Conversely, Berthier was an almost perfect example of the purely academic staff officer; translating Napoleon's laconic instructions into crystal-clear orders with a skill that was sadly wanting when he was put in the actual command of troops—as the opening gambit at Ratisbon very grimly demonstrated. Soult, per contra, a most gallant and accomplished leader of troops, proved a conspicuous failure when he followed Berthier as the head of the

very well for Colonel Campbell Dalhymple to pronounce that "The state of an army consists in an attention to the eating, drinking and sleeping of the common soldier," but as yet no system had been perfected to ensure that these things were the concern of an organizational apparatus rather than the sport of capricious and untutored personal endeavor.

Frederick the Great had realized the need, and made considerable provision for training staff officers; and with Jomini and Bourcet to lay somed out into a full-blown establishment, with a permanent home at Camberley and a periodical intake averaging 120 students. In due course it was decreed that only those who had graduated at Camberley should qualify for appointment to the general staff.

³Wellington was, of course, a first-class staff officer, both by instinct and hard-won experience. For example, one of the first things he did on landing on the Mondego in 1808 was to draw up a schedule of the respective loads for his pack and horsed transport, and a march table for the advance through Portugal.





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Running the gauntlet of resentful criticism

The United States, having founded the staff organization of its early Revolutionary Army on the English pattern, subsequently acquired many of the attributes of the Prussian school at the instance of Baron von Steuben. The end of the Revolutionary War, however, still left it with the permanent form of its general staff set-up undetermined. Neither was provision made for the specific training of staff officers with the foundation of West Point in 1802. Facilities for the higher education of commanders and staff officers were still wanting; and since no man appeared willing to court the unpopularity the recommendation of so blatantly professional a course of action would have entailed, the crying need of them was not to be met for many a weary year to come.

Apart from that bias towards amateurism in matters military which is, alas, common to the English-speaking peoples, both the United States and Britain appear to have shared a

reluctance to place too much emphasis on the training of a competent General Staff lest its creation should encourage the emergence of a class apart, a military clos bien fermé, aloof and holding itself superior to the general run of a rank and file quite sufficiently suspicious and on guard against the imposition of authority in any case. This was, perhaps, to concede too much to the rather sullen, hang-dog stupidity of the attitude towards "the High-Ups on the Staff" the fighting formations had elected to adopt, but such a consideration was not one entirely to be ignored. For a command and staff which is forever running the gauntlet of resentful criticism from its own troops, has its task of directing them woefully handicapped from the very outset. Human nature being what it is, to create a staff cast, forgetful of its regimental origins, and whose remoteness from the ordinary run of the army is further emphasized by special uniforms and

distinguishing marks — as was the case with the Germans and Austrians — is to put a heavy premium on want of sympathy and good understanding between the "directors" and the "directed."

Certain it is that with the British Army a considerably better feeling prevailed between the staff and the various corps and regiments when, between 1939 and 1945, the distinguishing scarlet hat-band and gorget patches ("tabs") were replaced by an unostentatious brassard for all staff officers up to and including the grade of lieutenant colonel. For childish as it may have been, few things had been more heartily detested by the ordinary rank and file than these gaily-colored symbols dis tinguishing the "Lesser Olympians" from their fellows-although their visibility afar off was not without its usefulness as a warning of "authority's" approach!

For "authority" might be in a minatory mood; since reproof is

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amongst the least grateful of the functions the staff is called upon to exercise; and who is not restive under reproof . . . especially if there is a carking consciousness of its being rather thoroughly deserved?

But even reproof can be administered rather on the lines of a suggestion than a reprimand; the firmness of an adverse comment is never undermined by tactfulness in it's administration. That resolves itself into a question of manner; and in their manner the "Lesser Olympians" are very largely a reflection of the commander they serve. In the main, a brusque, hectoring, slapdash staff will be found to do no more than echo a choleric, arrogant and impatient commander, so insistent upon a soaring standard of perfection as to lack appreciation even of the worthiest efforts to attain it, should they falter even momentarily by the way. Such a commander and such a staff can be confidently relied upon to alienate the sympathy and goodwill of the finest troops in the world, and to lend most pernicious encouragement to the preposterous legend that "the High-Up" enjoys such preferential treatment that champagne and cigars constitute his normal diet and a lordly château his only habitat. The pity of it is that the wrong sort of staff officer is seldom found out and got rid of until so much mischief has been done that its effect is almost beyond human remedy.

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A very different sort of commander must have inspired Max Earle, chief staff officer of the British 13th Division in 1914, who greeted a newcomer amongst the "Lesser Olympians" with the following admirable admonition, "Young feller, you now wear a red hat. So does the outside porter at a railway station. Yours, like his, is a badge of servitude. It is your job to fetch and carry for the Regimental Officer and man; and, by God, I'll see you do it!" To which may be added the exhortation hurled at the head of the present writer on the occasion of his own modest début amongst the "Lesser Olympians:" "Get out—get out and about, and see that he gets it today; if it's impossible he'll probably have to wait till tomorrow for

it. But see that he gets it. Never mind all the "paper" piling up on your table; in time half that "bumf" will cancel itself out. But if one flat-footed, cheese-faced soldier gets cancelled out through any neglect of yours, I'll personally strangle you with your nice new red hat-band. Now get out and get on with it!"

All of which is sheer horse sense. For it is no use for the staff officer to write a perfect order and thereafter sit back with folded hands, content to reflect that should a contretemps arise, the directive having been impeccable, no possible blame can attach to him. For such a costive, selfsufficient, parchment-minded pedant the only possible fate is speedy relegation to the task of counting empty jerry-cans down at the base. For a staff officer must not only write an order, but must hie him forth to lend an unobtrusive hand in carrying it out; ready at any moment to improvise a way through whatever difficulties may arise, and cheerfully resolve the situation with the aid of such additional resources as he can command. Under conditions of war, no plan can be considered even potentially sound which does not contain within itself an alternative. capable of prompt erection on the disarticulated skeleton of its prostrated progenitor. It is the hallmark of the competent staff officer that he always has an alternative up his sleeve, should things go wrong with the original "book of the words."

PERHAPS ABOVE ALL else, the staff officer should be a "good mixer." The more intimately he knows the individual officers of his formation, the more friendly the footing on which he stands with them, the less defensively impersonal will be his relations with them in his capacity as a link between the higher authority who gives the orders and the men who have to carry them out. Among the British this has been termed the "dear-old-boy technique;" and it is noticeable that its detractors are invariably to be found amongst those too spiritually frigid, too socially gauche and too temperamentally inflexible to operate it successfully.

The exact status and entire range of an "Olympian's" duties were defined in a letter penned by the veteran Duke of Wellington in October of 1827. "Every Staff Officer," he wrote, "must be considered as acting under the direct orders and superintendance of the Superior Officer, for whose assistance he is employed, and who must be considered responsible for his acts. To consider the relative situation of the General and the Staff in any other light would tend to alter the nature of the service."

To which for the consideration of the ordinary run of officers and men, it may be permissible to add this final word: The staff officer is working for you. That's what he's for, and he's fully aware of it. What's more, since he's had a pretty good grounding in regimental soldiering himself, he probably knows quite as well as you do what you're likely to want, and the relative degree of urgency with which you want it. He also knows how to get it to you; and get it to you he will if it is anywhere within the bounds of possibility. But don't automatically blame him if sometimes you don't get things delivered FOB, E and OE, right-sideup and carriage-paid, right on your doorstep, five minutes after you've put in for 'em. The transport bringing 'em overseas may have been sunk; a battery may have turned 'em into splinters on the way up. "The High-Ups" are doing all they can to help, and taking all things into consideration, they're not doing too badly at that. They've done all they can - with careful planning, wellorganized support and all the provision possible in a choice of difficulties - to give you every chance in that tricky little operation you've got to tackle tomorrow morning. And they'll be standing by to lend a hand to putty-up if things go wrong; in the same way that they'll be right behind you, to help you make the most of things, if all goes well. Don't fuss at them; and don't, by your own neglect, make it necessary for them to fuss at you. You've both got a job to do-you to fight, they to see that you fight under the most favorable possible conditions; and if you pull together, you'll make a job of it of which you can both be proud.... Remember that notice they used to stick up in the old-time saloons out West? "Don't shoot the pianist; he's doing his best." Chew it over for a bit and maybe you'll come to realize that the same thing pretty well goes US & MC for the staff.



having safeguarded your classified documents, in strict conformity with the Navy Security Manual for Classified Matter, to see the information contained in those documents featured in a sensational six-page spread in the current issue of Squint magazine. Did somebody drop the security ball somewhere along the line? Has the dope been declassified or downgraded and the word not filtered down to your echelon? Or—is a wise feature writer making some well-educated guesses?

Most of us, through experience and training, have become capable of subordinating the very human inclination to boast, "I know a secret." But after a comprehensive discussion of certain classified matters by a syndicated columnist or after seeing a detailed cross-section drawing of our latest "secret weapon" in a national magazine our attitude is liable to be that since the lid is off, so are all security bets.

It is the opinion of many civilians and some military men that there is a general tendency to over-classify information of military significance. It has even been rumored that really important information at the Pentagon is no longer classified "Top Secret," but that a higher classification called "DBR" has been developed. In case you haven't guessed, those initials caution the recipient to "Destroy Before Reading." Disinto find the which ly, classification sciences with the and the erated weapon cyclic

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It isn't always easy to see why a particular piece of information is assigned a relatively high security classification. A casual reference to production figures or to some new or specialized technique which might be used in future operations may send an otherwise innocuous little unclassified document soaring to the "Secret" or "Top Secret" category.

Let's go back, at this point, and review that sensational exposé in

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CONFIRM OR DENY

unless the audience is a trained enemy agent

By Maj R. M. Head

squint magazine. For purposes of illustration we'll say that its subject is "The Supersonic Radiological Disintegrator Pistol, Mark II." We find that the article has a few facts which are quite true and, incidentally, classified "Top Secret." Squint's science-fiction editor has come up with the correct weight of the piece and the fact that it is a sonic operated, air-cooled, clip-fed, hand weapon. However, his figures on the cyclic rate of fire, maximum effective range and muzzle velocity are all haywire.

Enemy intelligence agent K-9 supplied himself with a copy of Squint at the local newsstand and is now busily engaged in extracting intelligence on this newest development in ordnance materiel. Since we have been to Special Weapons School (Small-arms Branch) we know that he has some accurate information and some more that is pure hogwash, but he doesn't know which is which. Let's leave it that way. Don't confirm-don't deny. K-9 and his cohorts may figure it out in a few years, but don't do their work for them.

One of the easiest ways agent K-9 might solve his problem of deciding just which facts are true and which false might be to introduce the magazine article into casual conversation with service people he knows or is able to meet, particularly if those individuals are on duty in an establishment which is engaged in the development or field-testing of the equipment in question or similar equipment. He might pretend to accept the facts contained in the magazine as gospel and let his unsuspecting informant "pooh-pooh" the inaccuracies contained in it. He also might utilize the opposite approach and take the stand that the magazine article is too fantastic for belief, in hopes that his contact will disagree and point out the published data which has foundation in fact.

Foreign intelligence agents are

scientifically trained to collect numerous bits of seemingly harmless information from conversation and rumors which circulate in the vicinity of military and naval activities. Often they deliberately give false and erroneous information in order to see whether or not it will be denied. These agents cannot be recognized by their appearance. Unfortunately they don't all wear bushy beards or speak with foreign accents. Nor do they confine their activities to any particular geographical area. That affable gentleman you met at the cocktail party in Washington, and the friendly civilian who bought you a beer in that San Diego bar may both be feeding information into that funnel which has its smaller end in the enemy's G-2 office. The fact that an individual is in uniform doesn't make him a good security risk either. It doesn't take a National Agency check to buy military uniforms and insignia, and an agent who is operating in disregard of the Espionage Act is not going to worry too much about the unauthorized wearing of a service uniform.


Now, if these foreign agents have to go out and dig for the information they want, they expend time, energy and money. It's a basic rule of defensive warfare to make the enemy pay the largest possible price for the least possible advantage. Usually this is interpreted as the largest price in men, guns, ammunition, tanks and the like for the least possible amount of real estate, friendly casualties or prisoners, but it just as surely applies in the counter-intelligence field. If we can make the enemy's intelligence organization pay enough in time, money and energy it may not be worth his while to pursue his search for a particular piece of information-and what the enemy doesn't buy before hostilities commence he has to buy later on the battlefield.

The whole process of classification

begins with the drafter of the document. Even before the first rough draft of his document is prepared, he assigns an appropriate classification in order that all notes, comments and other working papers can be safeguarded properly. If he finds that the finished product does not require such stringent security measures as he originally considered that it would, he can downgrade it as practicable, so long as the matter is entirely within his cognizance. In this regard he is responsible to his commanding officer for the proper classification of the finished product.

If it becomes desirable to downgrade or declassify a document, and the requirements of security can still be met by the lower classification, the originating agency or higher authority in the chain of command may effect the necessary change. Whenever such action is taken, all interested parties shall be notified officially. It should be noted that only the originating agency or a higher authority having primary cognizance over the subject matter can take action to downgrade or declassify it. So let's not assume that a piece of security information has been declassified unless we have it in writing by competent authority. And the term "competent authority" does not include journalists, magazine editors or television news analysts.

One of the most potent weapons of a "cold war" is an aggressive corps of intelligence agents. Our potential enemy has this weapon. It's up to us, by passive means, to deny him its efficient employment. In short, button your lip and keep it buttoned. If you are drawn into a conversation where you feel that you might possibly reveal classified matter, play it safe. Say, "Interesting, isn't it?" Then change the subject to a discussion of the relative merits of Marilyn Monroe and Jane Russell, or which teams will play in the World Series this year.



i-Bandit War & & & & & &

When a commander fails to tailor his tactics to the forces at his disposal, he is doomed to failure. The guerrillas found this out in the mountains of northern Greece

Part II

COMPOSITION OF FORCES

FROM THE START OF THE BANDIT war to its end, the "Democratic Army" consisted almost exclusively of light infantry. The guerrillas had a "cavalry brigade" and some antiaircraft and field artillery. Artillery, however, was of little value. Neither the guns nor any quantity of ammunition could be concentrated for employment. Except in the Grammos and Vitsi areas, where it was used both in defense and in support of guerrilla attacks, artillery was employed only in delivering sporadic harassing fire on towns or vilages. It contributed to the campaign of terrorism against the civil population, but its military significance was slight.

The services of the "Democratic Army" were, for the most part, established beyond the frontier where they were protected from attack. They included training centers, transient camps, hospitals and forwarding points for supplies. Within Greece, except in the base areas, services were provided by the fighters themselves or by collaborators.

Capabilities and limitations

Since they were lightly equipped and unimpeded by service elements or territorial responsibility, the guerrillas had good mobility in a tactical sense and a high degree of flexibility. Bands could be subdivided without appreciable loss of combat efficiency. Conversely, they could be increased to the limits of effective control. Every man was a fighter. The bands had no soft rear. They could face to the rear or to a flank with facility.


Evasion and temporary local concentration of superior forces—each an important page in the book of guerrilla tactical doctrine - were aided by this flexibility. When threatened by encirclement, bands could split into small groups to lie up until the danger passed or slip through Army lines to re-assemble far from the closing noose. Offensively, a temporary local concentration of superior forces could be built up in rear of Army lines or in the midst of Government-controlled territory by the infiltration of such small groups.

Concealment, too, was aided by the factor of composition. Of nondescript appearance and without heavy equipment, the guerrillas could sometimes melt into the civil population. Their formations were so inconspicuous by contrast with the large, comparatively well-equipped columns of the Army that the former invariably had the advantage of better combat intelligence.

The virtual absence of service troops which gave the guerrillas so much in tactical mobility and flexibility of employment was also the source of their greatest weakness. Bandit logistics, except in the border areas, could not support sustained combat operations and failed entirely under the demands of a protracted engagement.

Finally, as regards firepower the guerrillas had a high volume at short ranges, but little at medium and none at long ranges. The guerrillas were at their best in an ambush which they could break off, if need be, to disappear into rough terrain.

Guerrilla bunker — holding ground proved disastrous



They were excellent in a raid on an undefended locality or a night raid against a defended locality provided they had built up previously, as was their custom, a local superiority of force. They were at their worst in a daylight attack against a fortified position or in an effort to defend by holding ground. They were incapable of winning military decisions against orthodox formations, but they were well fitted to conduct war against the civil populace.

The attempt to defend the base areas

The "Democratic Army" was employed initially in accordance with its capabilities; that is, in ambushing small forces, in raids against poorly defended localities and in sabotage of public utilities. As regards the Army, the guerrillas practiced harassment and evasion. In 1948, however, the "Democratic Army" began to hold ground. The old tactics were not given up. Indeed, when Army pressure on guerrilla positions had to be eased, raids in other areas became more frequent and more determined. It was simply that a new strategy was superimposed upon the old.

Its decision to hold ground placed the "Democratic Army" at a disadvantage and contributed to its defeat. Organizational changes were made to decrease the disadvantages of the new tactics, but the guerrillas could not alter materially the composition of forces factor. By the decision to hold ground they opposed light infantry in large, relatively static concentrations to attack by balanced forces. Thus they exposed weakness to strength and their initial success in the Vitsi area was due only to the Army's inability to exploit its own strength. Moreover, though the guerrillas turned the Government's 1948 offensive into a stalemate in front of Vitsi, they suffered severe casualties in men and morale from which they never fully recovered.

General organization

Colonel C. M. Woodhouse, wartime commander of the Allied Mission to the Greek guerrillas, in commenting on the contrast in structure between ELAS (Communist-dominated partisans) and EDES (rightist partisans), once observed that,

whereas the latter deployed forces in small bands commanded by comparatively independent junior officers, the "amateur strategists" of ELAS developed a large, centralized army of divisions and corps, in, which the chain of command was also a military hierarchy. In his view this type of organization was excellent for imposing military law on the areas dominated by ELAS, but poor for guerrilla operations.

When guerrilla operations were resumed in 1946, circumstances were different. The guerrillas were unable to assume responsibility for the governance of the civil population. A territorial organization was created but it was separate from the organization for combat. The zone of operations was divided into sectors. "Sector headquarters" exercised coordination within their areas but did not control operations. Their tasks were the establishment of communications, intelligence, logistics and the handling of political matters. Within the sectors were the hill masses used by the combat units as operating bases. The combat units were bands of different sizes which moved about freely within a sector or between sectors. In other words this was, by Woodhouse's standards, a good organization for guerrilla operations.

During 1947 the loosely-organized bands of 60 to 70 men grew into bicompanies and battalions as guerrilla strength increased. The guer-

rillas explained their failure to take the offensive during the winter 1947. 48 on the grounds of organizational weaknesses. In preparation for the Army's spring offensive, the guerrillas decided to consolidate the areas they held, and to effect "improvements" in their military or ganization to permit war on the plains. In short, they were departing from an organizational structure suitable for their purposes.

Reasons contributing to this decision can only be surmised. Perhans there were militaristic tendencies among the "amateur strategists." Perhaps guerrilla strength had grown to the point that the leaders anticipated challenging the Army in fullscale warfare. Perhaps the difficulties experienced in directing and to ordinating numerous independent bands were too great. More probably, however, the decision to reorganize resulted primarily from the decision to defend an area along the northern borders. The employment of the bands in a task of this nature would require more effective means of control.

The decision to defend represented a departure from the principles of guerrilla warfare. To attempt to hold territory indefinitely is to rely upon force of arms and the guerrilla who relies upon force of arms alone is doomed to defeat.

What induced the guerrilla leaders to make this decision? It may have been to give substance to the fiction

Storming guerrilla position



of the "Government of Free Greece;"
10 acquire a territorial base comparable to Yenan in China or the "People's Republic" in Korea; or it may have reflected guerrilla recognition that they could not continue operations without supplies from across the border. To secure their supply lines they must defend a base area through which supplies could pass on the way to the bands.

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In early 1948 the battalions of 1947 grew into brigades, and in May a guerrilla division was formed. By the end of 1948 the guerrillas had eight divisions. These eight divisions controlled some 23 brigades, 42 battalions, 25 bi-companies and 18 independent companies.

The gathering of light infantry into nominal "divisions" did not make them divisions in the sense of a force of combined arms. No supporting arms were added. The available forces were simply gathered into larger formations. These were not capable of meeting on equal terms the units of the Army which could find, fix and fight them with greater success than it had the smaller bands. The peculiar advantages of the guerrilla had been sacrificed. This departure from proper guerrilla organization and tactics assisted the Army during its 1949 campaign.

Government forces

The combat arms of the Army consisted of infantry, artillery, armored reconnaissance, tanks and combat engineers. Originally supporting arms were not organic to the division. They were under the control of various directorates of the general staff and units were attached to, or placed in support of, corps or divisions according to circumstances. The division, then, consisted of little more than infantry, headquarters and signal elements. Supporting arms, however, were established to provide certain attachments. A mountain division was normally reinforced by a cavalry squadron, a machine gun company, engineers and a regiment of mountain artillery. Field divisions were similarly reinforced, except armored cavalry and field artillery replaced cavalry and mountain artillery.

The basic difference between field and mountain divisions, the strengths of which were about 10,500 and 8,500 respectively, lay in the



Greek Army - trucks to the foothills, mules to the firefight

means provided for their transportation. The field division, of which there were three, was organized for war on the plains. Thus, it was equipped with motor transport. The mountain division was provided animal transport. There were four such divisions. The relative availabilities of animal and motor resources and varying operational requirements resulted in many variations from these standards as the war wore on. Finally, by the spring of 1949, the then-existing eight divisions were placed under the same establishment. The new division, the strength of which was about 9,300, included as organic elements an engineer unit, a scout company and a battery of 75mm pack howitzers.

The standard division, a compromise between the specialized field and mountain divisions, could operate effectively over any terrain. The new organization also recognized that the habitual widespread employment of Army units made it necessary to include as organic parts of the division a modicum of engineer and artillery support.

Infantry

In all, six types of infantry were employed by the Government. In addition to the mountain and field infantries referred to above, there were Commando infantry, National Defense Corps—subsequently light infantry, Gendarmerie and armed civilian components.

Commando (raiding force) units

At the onset of guerrilla activity the Army was not yet fully organized. It was deficient in training

and, to some extent, in equipment, and the organization of its combat units, even those of the mountain type, was not entirely suitable for combat against the comparatively small guerrilla bands of that period. There was, however, a psychological need for a measure of early success in arresting the depredations of the guerrillas. In this situation the British Military Mission, its thinking conditioned perhaps by the experiences of the United Kingdom in the early days of World War II, sponsored the organization of Commandos to speed training and to provide small units specially trained to combat guerrillas.1

¹Note: A parallel may be drawn between conditions in Greece at this time and those in the UK at the time of the withdrawal from Dunkirk. It was the latter which gave birth to the Commando concept in England. The Army, faced with a shortage of trained men and a shortage of weapons, could not field a significant force. Time was needed for rebuilding. In the meantime, it was thought that some offensive measures should be taken to keep the enemy on edge and to sustain the offensive spirit at home. The answer was the Commandos — small units of picked men or-ganized to raid and run. Their operations were usually launched from the sea-or from the air. It was a "back to the wall" strategy-a strategy born of limited means, the only thing that could be done at the time except to do nothing.

The early exploits of the Commandos in World War II received considerable favorable publicity. There was some experimentation with the idea in the U. S. The Marine Corps formed a few units designated "Raiders." The Army formed "Rangers." It was soon discovered that the U. S. had no real requirement for a "back to the wall" unit of this type. Actually they were a military luxury. Consequently these units were short-lived.

Forty Commando companies were formed initially. Subsequently these were organized into four groups of five companies each. The strength of the group was about 625. In the summer of 1949 the four Commando groups were placed under two brigade headquarters and a fifth group was organized.

As had happened in the UK and in the U. S., the best fighters were concentrated in the Commando units. They received better pay, equipment, training, living conditions and more publicity. Everything was done to set them up as a special category of personnel. This they became, but the reason for it lay not in this favoritism. The real sources of their esprit de corps were their intense military activity and a succession of military victories.

Owing to their offensive spirit and the widespread confidence they inspired, the Commandos began to gain a monopoly of the right to fight the guerrillas. Other units, recognizing their superiority, were content to let them do so. Commanders, appreciating their quality and the readiness with which they undertook operations, began to use them in preference to other troops in operations of all kinds. It became necessary for the Commander-in-Chief, who regarded these troops as a kind of strategic reserve, to state their proper role. Commandos were to be used along the following lines:

1. In night raids to open gaps in defensive works for later exploitation by infantry.

2. In deep raids into enemy-controlled territory.

3. In penetrations to attack the rear of enemy troops pinned down by fire, especially near the end of the fight.

4. As strategic reserves to be transported to the point of employment by rapid means such as aircraft.

Except for an initial reluctance to accept the idea of special units, the Commando concept was not questioned in Greece. They were regarded as lightly armed, highly mobile and very effective.

Actually the Commandos were not lightly armed; they carried more firepower than a corresponding number of infantrymen from a standard unit. Their mobility is questionable since they had no means of transportation



Government Commandos - monopoly on right to fight

save walking. Except for arms, however, they were lightly equipped. Consequently, they could be moved readily in transportation from external sources. They could operate effectively at night owing to their high state of training. They could gain surprise owing to their light equipment, their ability to make long marches and their superior fieldcraft, and they could make deep penetrations of the combat-patrol type owing to their ability to march and to operate for short periods with minimum equipment. They were not suitable for sustained operations and they were dependent to a far greater degree than standard units upon external administrative services.

It is doubtful if the functions assigned Commandos were of such a nature as to warrant the maintenance of special units, with the concentration of effort and dislocation of morale that such a course of action entails. To a degree the effectiveness of the Commandos was achieved at the expense of the standard infantry units. With proper training the latter could have performed the missions assigned the Commandos. They could, in addition, have held ground on the defensive or have taken their place in an attack against a fortified position. They could sustain themselves, moreover, without excessive reliance upon the service and supply agencies of the Army.

If the decision to form Commando units was justified by the conditions existing at the time that decision was made, the decision to maintain them indefinitely cannot be justified on those grounds. The Army had become engaged in large-scale operations and sufficient time had passed to get regular units organized and

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The British had in mind the further development of the Commandos as task forces for sustained pursuit and destruction of bands operating away from the main rebel bases an employment which might have justified their continuance as special units. The pursuit forces were to be air supplied, air supported and, insofar as practicable, airborne and air transported. This concept was not implemented, however, and the Commandos were retained in their original role.

National Defense Corps light infantry

The National Defense Corps battalion had a strength of 500. The battalions were formed from older classes of reservists to provide static defenses for towns, lines of communication and vital installations. As these units were posted, Army units were freed for a more active role. No sooner was this done than the mission of the Defense Corps itself was widened to include local offensive operations. This was followed by "revitalization" of an increasing

number of Deiense Corps units and their redesignation as light-infantry battalions. As the Army became more active, light infantry was used increasingly in the searching operations which used so much of the Army's time.

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Initial efforts of the Gendarmerie to undertake army-type operations to meet the rising tide of disturbances were unsuccessful. When it was recognized that the problem of maintaining public order had grown beyond police proportions it became a function of the Army, and the Gendarmerie returned to its normal role. However, it continued to assist in military operations. Mobile patrols were the principal means of co-operation between Gendarmerie and Army. These detachments, consisting of two or three squads, were equipped with Bren guns, Sten guns, the 2-inch mortar and radios. Following operations of the Army, the patrols conducted searches to insure that areas were free of guerrillas. This done, mobile detachments were broken down into station detachments with a static mission. This enabled them to operate as police.

Armored cavalry and tanks

Armored cavalry and tanks did not play a significant role. Unable to penetrate the mountain areas where most of the fighting took place, armor normally reinforced the garrisons of towns. It tended to raise the morale of the soldiers and particularly the townspeople, who were impressed by such tangible evidence of strength. Occasionally armor was used to support a counteroffensive to drive guerrillas out of a captured town. Armor may have disturbed the guerrillas. Their extensive use of AT mines, and their efforts to build up an anti-tank capability by the acquisition of AT guns and by the designation of infantry "tank fighters" suggest as much. It is doubtful, however, if the largely psychological advantage which accrued to the Army by its possession of armor justified the effort which went into the maintenance of this arm.

Supply and service elements

Unlike the guerrillas, the Army was supported by extensive supply and service elements. By virtue of

its dispositions and its great numerical superiority, the Army controlled all essential routes of communication. This, with its resources in motor and animal transport, gave it strategic mobility and staying power which tended to offset the guerrillas' greater tactical mobility. Motor transport had little value in the mountainous country to which the guerrillas normally withdrew to nullify the Army's advantages in transport and heavy weapons. It did, however, enable the Army to maintain larger forces operating in the impassable area. Through its use, re-supply could be brought up to a roadhead, whence it could be forwarded by animal transport. The guerrilla, by contrast, had to get along with the supplies he carried with him as he withdrew to the hills, plus whatever he could gather off the country or move in by a long, slow and inadequate system of animal transport.

Summary

Owing to the composition of forces, the National Army enjoyed two great advantages over the "Democratic Army." First, it was capable of fielding balanced forces of combat arms, whereas the guerrillas were infantry only. Second, it was adequately supported by supply and service elements. This gave it strategic mobility and tactical staying power. The guerrilla, on the other hand, had few service formations outside the base areas. Thus, his units in south and central Greece

had little strategic mobility and limited staying power.

At the onset of the war the guerrillas employed their forces in accordance with their capabilities. In 1948, however, they began to defend certain areas along the northern border and to employ larger formations in south and central Greece. In so doing they placed themselves at a disadvantage with respect to the superior arms and logistic capabilities of the Government forces. Following the 1948 campaign the guerrillas attempted to constitute artillery and other supporting arms, but their efforts met with little success. Their final military defeat was due in part to their effort to oppose a balanced force of arms with infantry alone. The guerrillas at no time had the capability of directly opposing the Army. Why they allowed themselves to be placed in this position is difficult to understand.

ARMAMENT


The "Democratic Army"

The table of equipment for a guerrilla brigade, the strength of which was about 1,500, provided the following armament:

Pistols	55
Rifles	963
SMGs	393
LMGs	81
HMGs	6
Light mortars	27
Medium mortars	6

So far as is known, no guerrilla brigade ever attained a strength of 1,500, and it is improbable that any

Defense Corps - from "Home Guards" to light infantry



brigade was ever equipped in the prescribed manner. Guerrilla methods are not characterized by such precision. Nevertheless, the table is of value as an indication of guerrilla thinking with respect to armament. Probably no more accurate estimate of the numbers and types of weapons in the hands of guerrillas could be made than one arrived at by distributing arms to the total number of guerrillas in accordance with the ratios established by this table. It would be necessary to add the limited number of heavier crew-served weapons not included in the brigade table of equipment. These included light field and mountain artillery, light AA and AT guns and a few heavy mortars. The total number of weapons would also include those stored locally and the resources of the governments to the north. There is little evidence that the guerrillas ever experienced shortages in weapons, except in isolated instances where they were due to difficulties in distribution rather than to an over-all shortage.

The guerrilla weakness in weapons was the result not of short supply but of lack of standardization. There was infinite variety in their weapons. This diversity was the product of their manifold sources.2 It gave the guerrillas many headaches and prevented them getting maximum performance from their armament. Weapons training could not be standardized. Weapons maintenance was rendered difficult by a shortage of spare parts and by the fact that parts were not interchangeable between the various makes. Perhaps worst of all was the fact that ammunition supply was infinitely complicated. Weapons were often out of action because ammunition of the proper type was not available at the right time and pla ... while local supplies of ammunition

2Note: The Italians invaded Greece in November 1940 and the Greeks drove them back into Albania where they held them until the Germans attacked in April 1941. During this time much Italian equipment had been captured and when the Greek Army was dissolved a portion of this equipment, along with some from the Greek Army, found its way into hiding or into the hands of the people. Before long the Germans began supplying arms to the security battalions. Some of this ultimately fell into the hands of ELAS. Italy having surrendered, an Italian division surrendered to Allied representatives in Greece



Mines! A mechanized Greek Army had to dig

were sometimes partially useless. These problems were magnified by the widespread deployment of guerrila units and poor communications. A significant increase towards the end of the war in German weapons, rifles, in particular, may have been due less to the exhaustion of Balkan stores than an effort on the part of the guerrilla to standardize arms.

Apart from their variety, guerrilla weapons were those used by infantry the world over. The conditions of the war, however, brought the mine into great prominence. The guerrilla, having no motor transport, could place anti-tank mines at will, knowing that they would not interfere with his own movements. The limited roadnet and poor trafficability of the terrain off the roads insured a profitable return. Anti-tank and anti-personnel mines were employed extensively both offen-

ELAS was able to disarm the division and keep its arms. In 1943, British naval units began to deliver arms to the west coasts of Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia. Finally, the Germans, when they withdrew from Greece, left stores of ammunition and weapons, knowing that they would be used against the Government and the British.

After the war the Tito partisans came to power in Yugoslavia and Chetnik equipment, as well as abandoned German equipment, came under their control. When the Yugoslavia Army was supplied with new equipment from the USSR, some of this material found its way into Greece.

sively and defensively and for sabotage. Their weight was a disadvantage but tens of thousands were transported into Greece and the hundreds of legless men one sees there today give convincing evidence of their effectiveness. The mine was the most effective single weapon in the guerrilla arsenal. lat

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AN EXAMINATION of the quantities of arms and ammunition recovered in the base areas at the conclusion of the final campaign is informative. It will be recalled that the guerrillas were driven out of the Grammos area late in the summer of 1948, at which time the Army searched the area for stores. It will be recalled. too, that the Vitsi area had been lightly garrisoned until it was reinforced by troops from the Grammos position. Thus, with minor exceptions, the arms and ammunition found there had been built up in the Vitsi area after November 1948, and in the Grammos area after January 1949. The inventory discloses that:

The supply of infantry weapons was plentiful.

An effort had been made by the guerrillas following the 1948 campaign to build up firepower in the base areas by the acquisition of artillery, anti-tank, anti-aircraft and infantry guns as well as heavy mortars.

Marine Corps Gazette • February, 1954

mortars. intro

Sizeable stocks of such weapons had been made available by the satellites.

While adequate stocks of AT and AA ammunition had been accumulated, stocks of artillery ammunition had not been built up to the level required for a sustained defense of the base areas.

The reserves of small arms ammunition were extremely limited.

As there are no other indications of a general shortage of small arms ammunition, the evidence of this inventory cannot be accepted as conclusive in this regard. There is no reason, however, to doubt the shortage of artillery ammunition. It may have been due to the inability of the supply system to transport sufficient heavy ammunition to maintain an adequate level. Again, Balkan stores in artillery ammunition may have been exhausted. More likely, however, it was due to the fact that Yugoslavia, holding most of those stores, was no longer releasing them to the guerrillas. This explanation would be consistent with a shortage of small arms ammunition and not inconsistent with the relatively good levels of AA and AT ammunition which were found, since these types, unlike small arms and artillery, were little used.

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In respect to armament the objective of creating a modern army in Greece had not been attained when operations against the guerrillas began. Although there was a standard table of equipment, the weapons on hand varied from unit to unit according to the availability of equipment.

The principal infantry weapons were the .303 rifle, the Sten gun and the Bren gun. The last named was distributed one per squad or about 36 per battalion. The only crewserved weapons in the battalion were mortars. A 2-inch mortar was placed in each rifle platoon. The only battalion weapon was the 3-inch mortar. In summary, the armament of the battalion included:

3 or 4 — 3-inch mortars 12 — 2-inch mortars Approx 36 — Bren guns Approx 600 — .303 rifles

Approx 75 — Sten SMGs

The brigade consisted of three battalions. No supporting arms were introduced at this level. The divi-

sion, in turn, consisted of three brigades. No supporting arms were organic with the division. However, a medium machine gun company of 16 Vickers was normally attached and there was available for the support of each division about two batteries of artillery and a reconnaissance squadron.

The artillery was organized into eight regiments. The mountain regiment consisted of two batteries of 3.7 mountain howitzers. Sometimes attached was a battery of 4.2 mortars. The field regiment consisted of two batteries of 25-pounders. In addition, there were two batteries of

Increases in armament under U. S. aid program

U. S. military aid made it possible to rectify some of the shortcomings in armament, but changes came slowly. To have completely reequipped the Army with U. S. weapons would have required more funds than were available and necessitated extensive re-training. British equipment, however, was by late 1947 deteriorating and war surpluses in the U.K. were being exhausted rapidly, especially small arms and crewserved weapons. This approaching exhaustion of British stocks necessitated the gradual replacement of



Tanks - not practical for guerrilla hunting

medium artillery consisting of four 5.5s each.

The armored reconnaissance squadrons, equipped with the U. S. scout car and the British-made Humber armored car, were organized into reconnaissance regiments, of which there were three. To complete the list of armament, it is only necessary to add three small tank units equipped with British Centaur tanks of limited serviceability, and later the U. S. Sherman.

A casual inspection of this armament establishment reveals that it is light, even by mountain standards. Particularly striking are its deficiencies in machine guns and artillery. But limited numbers and firepower of the weapons were not the only shortcomings. Much of the equipment had been war surplus in the first place and ordnance maintenance was deficient.

many items. Bringing the U. S. Mission into a field which had previously been the responsibility of the British Mission, that of organizational policy, this development, together with the resources at the disposal of the U. S. Mission, brought about certain improvements in the armament establishment. The improvements came gradually, however, and did not hit their full stride until after hostilities were over.

The first change in armament was the substitution of the 60mm for the 2-inch mortar. This was followed by the gradual substitution of the 81mm for the 3-inch mortar. The absence of sufficient artillery suitable for mountain operations having been noted, the 75mm pack howitzer was procured and delivery was made in the spring of 1948. A battery of four guns was provided each division, a development which went a



long way towards increasing its selfsufficiency and its effectiveness in mountain warfare.

By February 1948, the contracting quantities of British weapons dictated their concentration in certain units. A decision was reached to replace the .303s, the Bren guns and the Vickers machine guns in three divisions and nine light infantry battalions with the 1903 rifle, the Browning automatic rifle and the M1919A4 machine gun, respectively. The changeover was effected in two of the three divisions prior to the final battle.

The advent of the U. S. light machine gun served to bring about a re-organization of the machine gun establishment, not only in the three divisions to be U. S.-equipped but the five British-equipped divisions as well. The division machine gun company was replaced by a four-gun platoon in each infantry battalion. This increased the machine guns in the division from an entirely inadequate 16 to 36, and placed them organically at the level of their normal employment.

To meet the need for a direct-fire weapon suitable for attacking covered emplacements, two new weapons were introduced in July 1949 the 2.36 rocket launcher and the 75mm recoilless rifle. Rocket launcher teams were organized on the basis of nine per division, and a mule-transported recoilless rifle company was formed. The latter was to be assigned to the highest commander in the battle area who could re-assign its elements in accordance with the tactical plan and the nature of the enemy fortifications. The early collapse of the guerrillas did not permit full evaluation of the usefulness of these weapons.

Armament of raiding forces

When the decision was reached to re-equip three divisions with U. S. arms it was also decided to re-equip the Commandos. Prior to that date they had been equipped with the .303 rifle, a high ratio of Bren guns and submachine guns, but no ma-





chine guns. In this case the M1 rifle rather than the Springfield replaced the .303. Fifty-eight Browning automatic rifles per group replaced a like number of Bren guns, and Bren guns on hand in excess of this number were retained. Five 2.36 rocket launchers were issued. Machine guns were issued for a group machine gun platoon. The conversion of the Commando units was accomplished quickly and all five groups were reequipped prior to the final campaign.

Arms for civilian components

The problem of arms for civilians was always vexing. Following the liberation, the Government had permitted the distinction between official and unofficial means of combatting guerrillas to become hazy. When the Government in November 1946 requested arms for civilians in north Greece, the United Kingdom, still smarting from the effects of criticism following its support of the Greek Government in 1944, flatly refused. However, other arms were issued and the question of resupply of ammunition arose periodically thereafter. At a later date and with improved organization of the civilian components during the re-settlement of refugees, .303 rifles of limited serviceability were issued for civilian use.

Armament of National Defense Corps, light infantry

The initial weapons allowance for Defense Corps battalions included rifles, Sten guns, 25 Bren guns and twelve 2-inch mortars. As additional equipment became available they were armed with four 81mm mortars and four Vickers machine guns, and the number of Bren guns was increased to 36. The machine gun was given to the NDC battalion even before the regular Army battalion, presumably because of the static defensive role of the former and its isolation.

Adequacy of armament

In view of the limited capabilities of artillery, particularly prior to the



Vitsi guerrilla bastion-

formation of the mountain howitzer batteries, and in view of the failure to develop fully the air support potential, the conclusion is inescapable that the Army was not armed to meet the guerrillas on the most favorable terms. Some improvements in infantry firepower were made in the final year of the war; an increase in machine guns and their incorporation in the infantry battalion, the re-equipment of the raiding forces to include machine guns and M1 rifles and the issuing of rocket launchers and recoilless rifles. These developments, however, came too late to have any material effect during the war. In all probability the war would have ended where it ended and when it ended had no changes in armament occurred.

This is not to say that these changes should not have been made. It is unfortunate that they were not made earlier. Until these changes were made the infantry had been less efficient than it might have been. As a matter of fact, throughout most of the war it was equipped by the standards of 1918 rather than those of 1948. In our own forces we seek a proper balance between firepower and manpower, erring, if at all, on the side of providing more firepower than can be exploited fully. When possible we should do as much for our allies. This observation, of course, is made with the benefit of hindsight. No one could foresee in April 1947, when the aid program began, that hostilities would drag on until September



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Comparison of armaments and summary

A comparison between the total numbers of guerrilla and Government weapons has no more significance than a comparison between the total personnel strengths of the respective forces. In the early stages of the war the guerrilla, man for man, was as well-armed as the soldier of the National Army. An Army unit had no advantage in firepower over a guerrilla unit of equal size, except when the former had the benefit of artillery and air support. This generalization must be qualified owing to the diversity of guerrilla weapons, with consequent lack of standardization in training and poor maintenance, and to the inability of the guerrillas to provide ammunition for sustained combat except near the northern border.

Late 1947 - For the Greek Army new U. S. weapons



This condition, which was not ameliorated appreciably until machine guns were placed in the infantry battalion and their numbers increased in the summer of 1949, emphasizes the importance of artillery and air support. The effectiveness of both, however, left something to be desired. As regards artillery, the greatest limiting factor was the terrain. Mountain artillery alone could be employed in most areas and oftimes even it could not be moved to the battle area. A second factor was the limited availability of artillery, particularly mountain types. With the wide dispersal of units it was not possible to provide artillery support whenever and wherever it might have been employed profitably. The factor of availability was altered in mid-1948 with the arrival of the U.S. pack howitzer and the organization of a battery for each division. Thereafter, a modest amount of artillery support could normally be provided wherever it was required.

An additional limiting factor was the technique used in controlling artillery fire. The artillery OP observer was used for the adjustment of fire rather than the forward observer. This technique was not always capable of providing the kind of closein fire support needed to reinforce the fires of infantry weapons.

In contrast to the fluid operations elsewhere, the attacks made into the northern base areas were prepared deliberately and the Army was able to concentrate its artillery. When this was done, artillery support approached the status of a decisive factor.

That the guerrillas recognized their weakness vis-a-vis the artillery of the Army is attested by their efforts, between their defeat in the Grammos in 1948 and the final campaign, to build up an artillery arm in the base areas, particularly Vitsi which they occupied the longer. Artillery pieces of various types were obtained, but the guerrillas were unable to constitute an effective artillery arm. Their failure may be attributed to a lack of artillery know-how; to the action of the air force in seeking out and destroying gun positions; and to inability to obtain adequate supplies of artillery US # MC ammunition.

(To be continued next month)

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BUUKS OF INTEREST TO OUR READERS

review

Rice Bowl Conflict . . .

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES — Louis Morton. 626 pages, illustrated. Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, Washington, D. C. \$5.25

In the context of global war, the Philippines did not, in 1942, possess great strategic significance. The Japanese tide had already swept around the islands and over southeast Asia and the Indies, through the Bismarck Archipelago and the Solomons to Guadalcanal, and eastward across the Pacific as far as the Gilbert Islands. Everywhere the Japanese had achieved phenomenal success, sweeping all resistance before them. Only in the Philippines had they been halted, and in this successful, though hopeless, resistance lay the real importance of the campaign. It demonstrated that the Japanese were not invincible, that they could be stopped by determined men ably led, even when the odds were heavily in their favor.



The Fall of the Philippines relates in detail how, for a few short months, the Japanese conquest of the Philippines was halted by a heterogeneous, and for the most part untrained, force of American and Filipino troops. The author covers our pre-war policy and program in the Philippines and the events which led up to the outbreak of World War II.

The attack on Clark Field by Japanese aircraft, an attack perhaps as disastrous to our initial war aims as Pearl Harbor, is covered in one of the most complete accounts of that action published to date. The

story of the Japanese landings, the futile efforts of the defenders to halt the enemy at the beaches and the eventual retreat to the temporary safety of Bataan is told in all its tragedy. The three months' defense of Bataan; the debilitating effects of the shortage of food, medicine and clothing; the disintegration of an army in the short space of six days; and the surrender on Bataan, in which disease and malnutrition played as great a part as did the actions of the enemy, are described vividly and minutely. The attack on Corregidor is portrayed against a background of the five months of constant air bombardment and artillery fire delivered on that tiny island.

No punches are pulled in this book, for documented evidence is available in nearly all cases, and is furnished the reader in the form of footnotes. Particularly good studies of terrain and weather are included with each extensively-covered action, as are numerous detailed and self-explanatory maps and sketches of these actions. The narrative itself is skillfully and powerfully written.

Reviewed by Major G. P. Averill

Biography of the Great Bear . . .

RUSSIA: A HISTORY AND AN INTERPRETATION (2 Vols.) — Michael T. Florinsky, Ph.D. 1511 pages, indexed. New York: The MacMillan Company. \$15.00

The large amount of research, evaluation and unremitting effort that went into Russia: A History and an Interpretation is indicated by the author's preface which relates that the MacMillan Company originally commissioned him to write this history in 1934. Having worked on the manuscript for almost 20 years, it appears that the author indulges in a bit of understatement when he says, "Whatever its shortcomings are, they cannot be ascribed to hasty workmanship."

And few, if any, are the short-

comings of Dr. Florinsky's text. The manner in which he organizes such a vast amount of historical information is logical both from the standpoint of content and convenience to the reader. Throughout the two volumes, each major era of Russian



history, from its beginning through the formative period of the Soviet regime, is developed with a wellrounded treatment of the political, military, cultural, economic and social forces that exerted their influence on the particular phase of history he is discussing. Fortunately, the author is not content with a mere assembly and interpretation of historical facts. Being the good historian he is, Dr. Florinsky places great, and useful, emphasis on the individuals about whom each major event of Russian history revolved. The result is that the text contains short but readable and highly informative biographies of those who played key roles in the making of Russian history.

Military readers will be pleased with the author's treatment of the Napoleonic period as it related to Russia. Also, with reference to more contemporary developments, there is much of value in the author's rather extensive treatment of Russian effort and objectives in the Pacific Asia. The long standing Tsarist desire to bring China into the Rus-

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sian sphere of influence, the growth of Russia as a Pacific power and the Russo-Japanese War and its aftermath provide valuable background on current developments in Korea and Asia as a whole.

There can be no doubt that Dr. Florinsky has provided the means for achieving a better understanding of Russia, her strength and her weakness, her objectives and her motives. This history of Russia is a monumental work.

Reviewed by Colonel J. D. Hittle

Russian Strategy . . .

SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE -Raymond L. Garthoff. 587 pages, illustrated. Illinois: The Free Press. \$7.50

This is one of the most complete, single volumes on Soviet military doctrine to be published. It covers the period from the time the Bolsheviks shouted, "Peace, Land and Bread" in 1917, until the Korean

Every aspect of the Soviet machine and its functions is in this book. The highlights, and some detail on subjects from morale to the complicated double envelopment, are discussed. It is in three parts.

Part One deals primarily with military and political strategy and doctrine with some detailed consideration of Soviet concept and its origin.

Next comes an analysis of Soviet principles guiding the conduct of war. The magnitude of the subjects in this chapter have been briefed down. Nevertheless, the material is presented in a most readable style.

Part Three is a general discussion of Soviet organizations and operational and tactical doctrine on the employment of the combat arms. Airpower, seapower and special combat operations are discussed in some detail in this section.

This is by far the most interesting recent book for military men on the Soviet military doctrine. It is really a textbook that requires studying if the reader is to get much out of it. The author obviously consulted hundreds of Soviet books, monographs and documents, and many of the references must have been classified. His interpretations of sections

of these documents and the amplification of them from interviews with Soviet officers are well presented.

Reviewed by LtCol N. A. Miller

Peace-loving Nazis . . .

UNCONDITIONAL HATRED - Cap. tain Russell Grenfell, R.N. 273 pages. New York: Devin-Adair Co.

This is such a controversial book it had to be published in the United States. It was too hot an item for the British publishers.

Imagine, if you can, a British writer (and a captain in the Royal Navy to boot) coming to the defense of Germany!

In tracing the decline of the British Empire from the days when the pound sterling was the most stable currency in the world to the present, Captain Grenfell states that the British have lost the fine touch that enabled them in the past to forgive and forget after the smoke of battle cleared.

The relentless efforts on the part of British leaders in the two great world wars caused an unreasonable hatred and fear of Germany. This was the wrong attitude to take, Captain Grenfell claims. Carefully documenting his case, he shows that when the facts are analyzed, Germany shows up as the most peaceloving nation in Europe! Only when placed in a position where it was impossible to gain her ends peacefully, did Germany go to war. And in the majority of cases her ends were justified, the British writer states.

To round out his book, Captain Grenfell takes a shot at Churchill. The captain states, without reservation, that Winston Churchill is not, and was not, a good politician. Nothing personal in the statement, the author says, but he questions whether "England's finest hour" was exactly that, or an overture to disaster.

Reviewed by 1stLt Paul E. Wilson

Maoism No Answer . . .

THE GREAT PEACE—Raja Hutheesing 246 pages. New York: Harper & Brothers.

The Great Peace answers many of the questions regarding the highly vaunted claims of the New Peoples Democracy of China. Raja Huthee

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The Marine Corps Association will pay \$50 for color transparencies, and \$25 for black-andwhite photos suitable for use on the cover of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE. Combat pictures of Marines in action are preferred, but good shots of training, maneuvers or anything featuring Marines or a Marine Corps subject (including still life) will be considered. Vertical composition is desired in all photos. Selection of pictures to be published will be made by the editors, and final acceptance will be dependent upon security review. Color transparencies accepted will be returned after publication. Black-and-white prints accepted will be retained. Every effort will be made to return all other material submitted; however, the publishers cannot be held responsible for any photographs lost or damaged.

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MAIL TO: MARINE CORPS GAZETTE BOX 106, MCS, QUANTICO, VA. sing went to China as a newspaperman to learn the truth about Mao Tse-Tung's government.

China's "Land Reform" shows itself to be a vendetta against large landholders. Trials by dictatorship take land away from established owners and turn it over to individual farmers. The system, however, defeats itself in that neither does it increase production nor make the farmer happy. The farmer having attained his eternal ambition to own land, is thwarted from his further ambition — to get rich on it.

The Chinese national economy is regulating itself out of existence, with the government taking all the profits and leaving only operating expenses. The Peoples Democracy asserts a desire for foreign investments, but burdens these interests with fantastic regulations and crushing taxes.

The author tells of his attempts to investigate the charge against the United States of germ warfare. In Raja Hutheesing's words, "The very exaggeration had laid the Chinese case bare as propaganda and nothing else."

In all, the book is a simple report of what Mr. Hutheesing saw and heard. He is not an old China hand harping for the days of the Empire. The Great Peace is objective and avoids comment on the basic evil or good of Communism.

Reviewed by Major James D. Jordan

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The Spirit of St. Louis Charles A. Lindbergh. The first complete account of the famous Lindbergh flight, including the story of the planning, the testing and training that went into the grueling 33-hour crossing of the Atlantic.

Russian Assignment Leslie C. Stevens. Unlike many other books about Russia, this one seeks to explain Russia in human, non-political terms by showing the intimate life of the average Russian.

Hitler's Defeat in Russia LtGen W. Anders. General Anders explains the strategy of the Germans in planning for the Russian campaign, and then goes on to describe the campaigns of 1941-1942 and those later undertaken by the Germans in 1942-1943.

Undersea Patrol Edward Young. Adventure runs rampant through the pages as Young recounts the multiplicity of new impressions he experienced during his first dive, the complete horror which was his when his submarine was very nearly cut in two by a friendly trawler and the thrill of sinking a German U-

Two Eggs on My Plate Oluf Reed Olsen. Blowing up important bridges under the very noses of the Germans, photographing an enemy airfield under cover of a savage bombing attack and being captured while inspecting a new German plane are a few of the many adventures of this patriot.

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